Dai Sung Han's Buddhist Blog

윈도우에서 데바나가리 키보드 입력하는 방법 

작성자: 동국대학교 인도철학과 박사과정 한대성 Email: daisunghan@gmail.com 

1. 제어판에서 국가 및 언어를 누른다. 

2. 국가 및 언어에서 ‘키보드 및 언어’를 누르고 ‘키보드 변경’을 누른다. 

3. ‘추가’를 누른다. 

4. ‘힌디어(인도)’를 누른다. 

5. ‘키보드’를 누른다. 

6. ‘데바나가리어’를 선택한다. 

7. 설치된 서비스에 힌디어가 나와있으면 ‘적용’을 누른다. 

8. 윈도우 하단 도구모음에 한국어 대신 힌디어를 설정한다. 

끝 ^^

데바나가리 키보드 배열은 이전 글을 참조 하세요 

The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed. The Thracians make theirs have gray-eyes and red-hair. And if oxen and horses and lions had hands and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their own.

Xenophanes (circa 570-circa 478 BCE.)

Seated mustachioed Buddha.Pakistan or Afghanistan, ancient region of Gandhara, 1st-2nd century CE.

Since the 19th century certain Buddhologists have speculated that Buddha was a member of the Scythian steppe nomads, some of whom had been encroaching since the mid-first millennium BCE into theGandhara region, becoming sedentary in the process, eventually reaching northwest India and founding an empire there in the first century BCE.

"Even a cursory acquaintance with later Vedic texts, like theUpanisads, and that of the earliest Buddhist and Jain texts leaves the reader wondering whether they can possibly refer to the same society, even though admittedly there is a time gap of a thousand years between their composition. The Sanskrit texts evoke a mostly agrarian way of life in which states play a minor part and status is governed by lineage and ritual observance. Buddhist and Jain texts, on the other hand, portray a network of functioning states, each with an urban nucleus heavily engaged in trade and production. Here wealth as much as lineage confers status. Indeed, the Buddhist concept of ‘merit’ as something to be earned, accumulated, occasionally transferred and eventually realized seems inconceivable without a close acquaintance with the moneyed economy." 

This is strong circumstantial evidence for the Buddha, or the man who the story of the Buddha was based on, actually having been a Gandharan, where urbanization developed ahead of north and east India.

Another piece of circumstantial evidence is found in the Digha Nikaya [DN 1.90-95] which tells a story of Buddha's people, the Sakyas/Scythians, as being 'foreign.' They are described by Ambattha as "fierce, rough spoken, violent, wanderers (sometimes incorrectly mistranslated as menials, but refers to their mendicant lifestyle; or could it be a slight on their nomadic past?). They do not respect Brahmins, nor pay homage to them." Upon visiting Kapilavatthu, hometown of the Sakyas, Ambattha explains them as those who "sat upon high seats in meeting halls, engaging in laughing, rough playing, poking each other with fists and fingers and paid no regard to [Ambattha]." In referring to Buddha, the "Scythian-sage" (Sakyamuni), he [DN 3.144] "has blue eyes." See here and here.

Relief panel with the Dipankara Jataka, (Megha and the Buddha Dipankara). Pakistan, Swat Valley, circa 2nd century CE.

The most visual circumstantial evidence, as the relief panel and Buddha image above show, is that Gandharan artists were still representing Buddha, (present and previous buddhas), as Aryans wearing Greek togas well into the Common Era.These are some observations to support the contention that Buddha was a Saka/Scythian:

1. Buddha was of the kshatriya (warrior) caste; foreign invaders were always co-opted into this caste by the Brahmins;

2. Buddha rejected the caste system;

3. Buddhism introduced animal motifs to India derived from the steppe peoples: the stag or deer, symbol of Buddha's first sermon in the deer park; the horse--Buddha rode out of his father's palace as a renunciate on his horse Kanthaka, which was immediately taken to heaven to be reborn among the gods; the Scythian eagle and lion griffins used as motifs at Barhut and Sanchi stupas, etc;

Relief panel with the Buddha's first sermon, showing the wheel and deer symbols.Pakistan, ancient region of Gandhara, circa 2nd century CE.

4. The cremation of bodies and the erection of burial mounds, or stupas (topes), previously unknown in India. 

5. The Buddhist ideal of the chakravartin, or wheel-turning, world-conquering monarch, to which kings aspired, a concept borrowed from the steppe peoples who must have been quite familiar with wheels and wagons;

6. One of the 32 marks of the mahapurusha, or great man (Buddha was one), was that he had blue eyes. This would indicate that Buddha was an Iranian/Caucasian.

1. From Relics of the Buddha by John S. Strong:

"This is not the place to examine the origin of thechakravartin ideal and its influence on the legend of the Buddha. Suffice it to say that the parallelism between the Buddha's funeral and that of a chakravartin continues a theme already implied in the doctrine of the twin careers of a mahapurusa. It is sometimes argued that this association with great kingship was intended to enhance the prestige of the Buddha as a figure of great distinction. At the same time, however, it is important to see one of the more specific implications of this. 

Jean Przyluski, who has looked into Northwest Indian, Hellenistic, and, ultimately, Ancient Near Eastern traditions as sources of at least parts of the chakravartin mythology, has argued that we should look in the same direction for the origins of relic worship in India. [Watch "Alexander the God King."] He points out that Alexander the Great was divinized and that a dispute erupted over his body, which the Macedonians felt would bring happiness and prosperity to the land where it was kept. Even more specifically, he cites the case of King Menander, whose ashes (according to Plutarch) were divided among the cities of Northwest India, which erected mnemeia, [memorials, i.e., caityas], over each portion. 

For Przyluski, then, the veneration of a great being's remains was intimately linked to the nascent cult of thechakravartin and both were imported ideologies. This is important because, if it is true, the fact that Buddha's body is to be treated as though it were that of a great king may not simply be intended to "glorify" or "divinize" him. More basically, it may be related to the injunction that his relicsbe preserved, and that his body not be handled like those of ordinary beings or of other sannyasins, whose remains were not preserved."

2. From The Indian Saint; or, Buddha and Buddhism: A Sketch, Historical and Critical, by Charles D. B. Mills, 1874: 

[Samuel] Beal [translator of Buddhist Records of the Western Worldfrom ancient Chinese], however, advances the opinion that [Buddha] was of Scythian descent. A branch or clan of this race, he thinks, may have penetrated Northern India, as another did Assyria about this time, and Buddha was born of this blood, a descendant of Chakravarttins or Wheel Kings, i.e., universal monarchs. Sakya's directions as to the funeral obsequies to be observed after his death, the cremation of the body, and the subsequent erection of mounds, or topes, in such numbers over India,--all, he deems, indicate a foreign parentage for this saint... But this of the directions is very probably a subsequent invention; it certainly comports little with his known character, and especially with the light esteem, almost the contempt, in which he is represented to have held the body. The weight of the evidence seems altogether in favor of the view that he was of the Aryan race and family of the Sakyas.

I don't agree with Mills' last part where he states that Buddha held the body in light esteem. In fact, Buddha had a very high opinion of himself and always wanted to be treated in a special way.

3. From The Indian empire: its people, history, and products By William Wilson Hunter (published 19th century).

There are indications that a branch of the Scythian hordes, who overran Asia about 625 B.C., made its way to Patala on the Indus, the site selected by Alexander in 325 B.C. as his place of arms in that delta, and long the capital of Sindh under the name of Haidarabad. One portion of these Patala Scythians seems to have moved westwards by the Persian Gulf to Assyria; another section is supposed to have found its way northeast into the Gangetic valley, and branched off into the Sakyas of Kapilavastu, among whom the Buddha was born. 

During the two hundred years before the Christian era, the Scythic movements come a little more clearly into sight, and in the first century after Christ those movements culminate in a great Indian sovereignty. About 126 B.C., the Tartar tribe of Su are said to have conquered the Greek dynasty of Bactria, and the Graeco-Bactrian settlements in the Punjab were overthrown by the Tue-Chi, [Yuezhi].

The football-field-size burial mound that Scythians made with sandstone from nearby cliffs which were the forerunner of Buddhist stupas. Above is Arzhan-2 in Tuva's Valley of the Tsars. (National Geographic, copyright infringement unintended).Archaeologists found undisturbed wooden vault with two skeletons and 44 pounds of gold (2). They also found rare remnants of clothing (3), a horse grave (4), but nothing at (1) where kings were usually buried.

Two centuries later, we touch solid ground in the dynasty whose chief representative, Kanishka, held the Fourth Buddhist Council, circa 40 A.D., and became the royal founder of Northern Buddhism. [Historicity of Fourth Council now doubted.] But long anterior to the alleged Tue-Chi settlements in the Punjab, tribes of Scythic origin had found their way into India, and had left traces of non-Aryan origin upon Indian civilization. The sovereignty of Kanishka in the first century A.D. was not an isolated effort, but the ripened fruit of a series of ethnical movements.

Coin of Kanishka, Pakistan, region of ancient Gandhara, circa 130 CE. Reverse, Hindu deity; Kanishka also struck coins with Buddha on the reverse, (below), where Boddo is clearly stamped. 

Certain scholars believe that even before the time of the Buddha, there are relics of Scythic origin in the religion of India. It has been suggested that the Asvamedha, or Great Horse Sacrifice, in some of its developments at any rate, was based upon Scythic ideas. 'It was in effect,' writes Mr. Edward Thomas, 'a martial challenge, which consisted in letting the victim who was to crown the imperial triumph at the year's end, go free to wander at will over the face of the earth; its sponsor being bound to follow its hoofs, and to conquer or conciliate' the chiefs through whose territories it passed. Such a prototype seems to him to shadow forth the life of the Central Asian communities of the horseman class, 'among whom a captured steed had so frequently to be traced from camp to camp, and surrendered or fought for at last.' The curious connection between the Horse Sacrifice and the Man Sacrifice of the pre-Buddhistic religion of India has often been noticed. That connection has been explained from the Indian point of view, by the substitution theory of a horse for a human victim.

Workers unearth the remains of 14 sacrificed horses; a measure of wealth on Earth and in the hereafter, horses were the mainstays in many Scythian graves. This herd is modest--Scythian graves elsewhere have been found with hundreds of horses. (National Geographic). 

Whatever significance may attach to this rite, it is certain that with the advent of Buddhism, Scythic influences made themselves felt in India. Indeed, it has been attempted to establish a Scythic origin for Buddha himself. One of his earliest appearances in the literature of the Christian Church is as Buddha the Scythian. It is argued that by no mere accident did the Fathers trace the Manichaean doctrine to Scythianus, whose disciple, Terebinthus, took the name Buddha. As already stated, the form of abjuration of the Manichaean heresy mentions [Buddha and the Scythian or Sakya], seemingly, says Weber, a separation of Buddha Sakya-muni into two. The Indian Buddhists of the Southern school would dwell lightly on, or pass over altogether, a non-Aryan origin for the founder of their faith. We have seen how the legend of Buddha in their hands assimilated itself into the old epic type of the Aryan hero. But a Scythic origin would be congenial to the Northern school of Buddhism: to the school which was consolidated by the Scythic monarch Kanishka, and which supplied a religion during more than ten centuries to Scythic tribes of Central Asia. [However, in the following article, the Sakas are said to be related to the East Iranians (i.e. they were Indo-Aryans).]

4. From Earth to Heaven--The Royal Animal-Shaped Weights of the Burmese Empire by Donald and Joan Gear: 
The invasions of the Greeks, Sakas, Parthians and Kushans into the Bactria and north India regions between the 1st century BCE and 2nd century CE led to one of the most creative periods in the history of India’s art. Another important influence was that of the Romans from about the 1st century BCE to the 4th century CE. 

In Ordos, bronzes with animal decoration continued until about the 5th or 6th century CE. This region is sometimes referred to as the last stand of animal art. At some time before the 2nd century BCE the Yueh-chieh [Yuezhi] in present day Kansu, not far from Ordos then at its peak of abundant production, must have contacted the Sakas of near Lake Balkash and acquired knowledge of its stag art, which, in modified form, could have been transmitted south through Szechwan to the semi-nomadic tribes of Yunnan. The Yueh-chieh subsequently drove out the Sakas (about 160 BCE) who then moved into northwest India, (Gandhara), while the Yueh-chieh became the Kushans at the west end of the Tarim basin. 

The Saka retained some of their animal art but the Yueh-chieh abandoned theirs. The region from the Black Sea to Mongolia, including Central Asia, from before the 8th century BCE was occupied by nomadic steppe tribes many culturally and probably ethnically related to the East Iranians (i.e. they were Indo-Aryans). Many belonged to the Saka group. Those occupying the region north of the Black Sea were named Scythians by the 8th century BCE Greeks, those west of the Altai mountains were called Saka by the pre-6th century BCE Persians and those east of the mountains, for convenience today, are called Saka-Siberian. On the northwest borders of China and in the Tarim basin region before the 2nd century BCE were the Yueh-chieh, also probably an Indo-Aryan people related to the Sakas. They were driven along with the Sakas by the Hsiung-Nu, a Turki people. The Indo-Aryans of about 2000 BCE and the Saka group are the most important of the steppe nomads to this work. 

Firstly, this is because the Indo-Aryan peoples of 2000 BCE brought to India in the Vedic religion basic concepts held by the steppe nomads which, together with Indian animism, led to Hinduism and Buddhism. Secondly, it is because tribes of, or related to the Saka group repeatedly invaded India from 2000 BCE onwards, so spreading their culture from the kingdoms and republics they established in India and thus leading to the flowering of stone architectural animal art in India from about the 2nd century BCE. 

The Saka influence on animal art appears to have flowed round both sides of the Tibet plateau and converged on southeast Asia. This flow of art and people may have led to the foundation of the first Burmese kingdom, Tagaung. The Yueh-chieh were driven away from their homeland by the Hsiung-Nu about the 2nd century BCE; part of the tribe moved south towards Burma and part moved west to the northern marches of India, changing their name to Kushan as they did so. There, for about five centuries, they became a great influence on the development of Mahayanist Buddhism and overland trade from the Persian to the Chinese borders. 
During their migration they drove a part of the Sakas before them and these settled in west India before temporarily extending their sway to the east of India south of the Kushans. The persistence of the word ‘Saka’ in various forms in India and Burma is noteworthy. Sakka is another name of Indra, the Indo-Aryan and Hindu god. Saka is the name of the group of tribes of which the Scythians were one. The Sakas, ‘people of the stag,’ are associated with the animal symbols of the chakravartin,(universal ‘wheel-turning’ sovereign). Gautama Buddha was the Sakyamuni, the sage of the Sakyas.

Lion capital of the pillar erected by Asoka at Sarnath. Mauryan, circa 250 BCE. Chunar sandstone, Height 2.5m. (Archaeological Museum, Sarnath). 

The lion is among the figurines created by the people of the Indus valley civilizations about 2000 BCE, though it does not become a frequently used motif, at least in durable material, until it was adopted by the Buddhists about the 3rd century BCE when it looks distinctly west Asian or perhaps Persian. The adoption of the lion motif instead of the tiger may have been because the Buddhists needed a royal symbol without the ferocious or steppe nomad association of the tiger, the emblem of the warrior caste into which Gautama Buddha was born. The stone-shafted pillars of India, usually referred to as Asokan pillars, can be separated into two age groups: pre-3rd century BCE and later. The early pillars bear, or bore, on their tops copper gilt images of the lion, the bull, and the elephant. Of these the lion image is by far the most frequent. It is also the youngest, replacing the bull and elephant images. It occurs in the region formerly occupied by the republican, warlike Licchavis and later by the Nandas. In style the images show the influence of the Anatolian Hittites (20th century-8th century BCE), as do those of the south Chinese lions of the 2nd century BCE—6th century CE. The Indian lion representation gradually changed its form, partly because most of the sculptors probably had never seen a lion, which was rare in India compared with west Asia and which today exists only in west India, and partly because it was intended to represent the broadcasting of a spiritual image. By the 11th century CE its shape had become unrealistic, humanoid, and subsequently became increasingly so. 

Left: Gold stag headdress pin; the deer became an important Buddhist icon.

Stags appear to be particularly important in the art and myths of Central Asia, the steppes and Siberia from 1500 BCE and earlier. The stag was especially used by the Altaian Saka people. It was one of the three main animals represented in their art, the others being the horse and the tiger. In the Indus valley civilizations of about 2000 BCE stag-horns were emplaced on composite creations. Portrayals show that Agni was horned. Agni was one of the chief gods of the Aryan invasion from the steppes of about 1000 BCE. Stag representations are not found again until the last two centuries BCE but then seem to be replaced mainly by ruminants with unbranched horns or does.

The two thousand five hundred-year-old Pazyryk rug, found in 1949 on the steppes of Mongolia in a Scythian prince’s tomb, already displays all the symbols later to be associated with Buddhism: the lotus blossoms, solar symbols, stags, horses, and eagle and lion griffins.

Except in the Upper Punjab, the deer was not worshipped in India. The Punjabi worship was derived from the Sakas, ‘the people of the stag,’ from near Lake Balkash, who ruled various parts of northern India from about the 1st century BCE to the 4th century CE. The horned lion or lion-griffin reached the Indus valley about 2000 BCE. The griffin was utilized by Alexander the Great and he may have introduced or reintroduced it to India about 325 BCE. Certainly two griffins of about 3rd century BCE occur at Patna. Lion-griffins and eagle griffins were employed in the sculpting on the Indian Buddhist temples of the 2nd to 1st century BCE, the motifs possibly having been introduced by the Scythians (Saka) invaders. The griffin and the lion-griffin motifs were distributed by the steppe nomads on the artifacts manufactured in western Asia, just as they transmitted artifacts and motifs from the Orient. 

The Scythians of east Asia adapted these motifs to their own requirements before the 7th century BCE. It is likely that the lion-griffin had reached the Altai, Siberia and China well before 1000 BCE. The Scythians preferred combat scenes with griffins as the aggressors and they themselves became especially associated with the griffin by the western world, which in fact made the association Scythia-griffin-gold because at that time, the Altai and adjacent regions produced much of the world’s gold. Lion-griffin figurines were present in Bactria in the 4th century BCE at a time when colonies of Greeks were working for the Scythians. In the 3rd-1st century lion-griffins were being made at Pazyryk in the Altai. 

The Neolithic religions of the Eurasian agriculturalists appear to have been characterized by a belief in earth gods, i.e. those of the earth as a whole, of the soil and of the underworld. This belief is expressed most obviously in the forms of earth mounds, sometimes capped by stones, megaliths, dolmens, menhirs, small stone pyramids and other structures. Such occur in Central Asia, Tibet, Mongolia, Assam, Orissa, Southeast Asia, etc. Later the belief was expressed in the form of pillars in India, Yunnan and Vietnam, as stupas in much of the same region and, in Southeast Asia, as temples intended to represent mountains, e.g. many Khmer temples. The natural, or man-made, elevations seems to have been regarded as a substitute for the body of the local earth god (and later for the tribe itself symbolized through the ancestors of the rulers) within which was concentrated the power of the deity, a capping stone often serving to concentrate the power still more effectively.

Celestial gods formed part of the cosmology but were less important than the earth gods. A link between the two kinds of god was often made by the use of a pillar or tree on or near the mound, but the elevation itself, especially if high, may have served as the link. Horse sacrifices, practiced by the Mongols, Turko-Tartars, Indo-European peoples and others, were always offered to the god of the sun and sky. The horse, especially a white one, symbolized the sun. In the Altai it was the function of the shaman, in a trance, to accompany the soul of a sacrificed horse on its celestial journey and also to offer horseflesh to the ancestors. Horse sacrifices and horse burials formed part of the burial rites of these peoples throughout the entire region, the best known being those of the Indo-Aryan Scythians, Sakas and other invaders of India.These rites and sun worship continued among the Mongols until after the 14th century CE, while Tartar chiefs continued to present thousands of white horses to the Chinese emperor until after the 18th century CE. In ancient India and elsewhere, long hair on shamans, such as the Ari favored, symbolized the snakes that appeared on the costumes and in the beliefs of the Central Asian shamans. The snake played an important role in Central Asian and Siberian mythology and on the shaman’s costume. The Indo-Aryans of about 1500 BCE, the Scythians of pre-8th century BCE and the Sakas of the same stock about 2nd century BCE all invaded India. They drank intoxicants like the Ari and took narcotics (soma, haoma) to attain ecstasy. The Sakas had ancestor cults. 

In Hindu-Buddhist cosmogony there are 33 gods who reside on the summit of Mount Meru, among whom Indra (Sakka) is king. In Central Asia the people of the Altai mountains have a belief in 33 heavens. In the 7th century BCE Saka-Siberian burial site of Tuva, just east of the Altai mountains, the chief’s tomb comprises a large central mound surrounded by a stone wall 44 meters away. The annulus so-formed is separated into sections by 32 radial spokes built of stones bearing incised depictions of horses. This is a temple of the sun. The number of 32 appears also as that of the number of bodily marks of the chakravartin. There seems to be good reason to think that the 32 fiefdoms of the chakravartin are derived from the solar cult of the Indo-Aryans and reached Burma through the Sakas.

The Aryan invasion of Persia and India of about 2000 BCE introduced the Vedic religion. The descendants of the Aryans and the Saka/Scythians (sun and snake worshippers) became allies perhaps before 700 BCE, the Sakas becoming known as ‘the serpent’ or naga race, while the naga itself became one of the most important associates of the Brahmanic, Hindu and Buddhist pantheons. According to the Indian Puranas, Gautama Buddha originated from the solar race of Iskshvahu and at the commencement of his ascetic life, he was protected by the naga king. Tombs of Gautama’s own Sakya tribe, excavated in the 19th century, each contained an effigy of a naga.

Naga king and his consort--Cave Temples, Ajanta, Maharashtra.

This is one of the several pieces of evidence linking Gautama Buddha with the steppe nomads. Vedism and indigenous animism merged to form Hinduism about the middle of the 1st millennium BCE, about the same time as Buddhism emerged. In the section entitled ‘Trade’ the voyages of the allied Sakas and Indo-Aryans as traders are mentioned and it is these which may have given rise to some of the Hindu legends, such as the ‘Churning of the Oceans,’ and the association of the naga with water. Beginning not later than the 2nd century BCE and increasing during the 1st and 3rd centuries CE, Buddhism spread to Central Asia under the dominant influence of the fervently Buddhist and-commercially-conscious Kushans, (the former Yueh-chieh), whose empire stretched from north India to Bactria and from the Parthian empire of Persia on the west to that of the Chinese Han empire on the east. Eastern Persia and much of Afghanistan also adopted Buddhism, parts remaining until after the Moslem invasion. 

In the shaman’s ecstatic techniques throughout central and north Asia, the number seven plays an important role, one which is due ultimately to influences from Babylon. On his costume, a Yurak shaman may have seven balls representing the seven celestial maidens. There are also the common beliefs in seven or nine each of celestial and infernal levels, though rarely, up to 33 occur. In his rites the Altaic shaman climbs a tree or a post notched with seven or nine steps to symbolize his ascent to the most powerful one. The seven steps are similar to the Buddha’s seven steps mentioned below, a concept derived from Buddhism’s parent, Brahmanism. In legend Buddha could walk immediately after his birth. He took seven steps in the direction of each of the cardinal points and claimed possession of the world. Seven days after Guatama Buddha’s birth his mother died. After Buddha’s enlightenment he meditated for three periods each of seven days. After these he was wrapped in seven coils of the serpent king, Mucalinda, and endured continuous rain for seven days. Seven also symbolizes the horse, one of the seven treasures of the chakravartin.

Posted by Thai Mangoes at 6:46 PM 

http://thaimangoes.blogspot.kr/2009/08/h9.html

WAS BUDDHA HISTORICAL?

인도 불교사에 있어서의 두 가지 문제 번역본입니다.

05_ (193-244)[번역]한대성_인도 불교사에 있어서의 두 가지 문제.pdf

4.3사건 진상조사 보고서 전문.pdf

MadyamakakarikawithChineseTibetanEnglish.pdf

23. viparyāsaparīkṣā trayoviṁśatitamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀顛倒品第二十三

saṁkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaśca kathyate|

śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṁbhavanti pratītya hi||1||

從憶想分別　　生於貪恚癡

淨不淨顛倒　　皆從眾緣生

།།འདོད་ཆགས་ཞེ་སྡང་གཏི་མུག་རྣམས། །ཀུན་ཏུ་རྟོག་ལས་འབྱུང་བར་གསུངས། །སྡུག་དང་མི་སྡུག་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག། །བརྟེན་པ་ཉིད་ལས་ཀུན་ཏུ་འབྱུང༌།

Lust, hatred, and confusion are said have thought as their source. Perversions regarding the pleasant and the unpleasant arise depending upon these.

śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṁbhavanti pratītya ye|

te svabhāvānna vidyante tasmāt kleśā na tattvataḥ||2||

若因淨不淨　　顛倒生三毒

三毒即無性　　故煩惱無實

།གང་དག་སྡུག་དང་མི་སྡུག་དང༌། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ལས་བརྟེན་འབྱུང་བ།། དེ་དག་རང་བཞིན་ལས་མེད་དེ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་ཉོན་མོངས་ཡང་དག་མེད།

Whatever perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant that occur dependently are not evident in term of self-nature. Therefore, the difilements are not in themselves.

ātmano'stitvanāstitve na kathaṁcicca sidhyataḥ|

taṁ vināstitvanāstitve kleśānāṁ sidhyataḥ katham||3||

我法有以無　　是事終不成

無我諸煩惱　　有無亦不成

།བདག་གི་ཡོད་ཉིད་མེད་ཉིད་ནི། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ཡང་གྲུབ་པ་མེད། །དེ་མེད་ཉོན་མོངས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནི། །ཡོད་ཉིད་མེད་ཉིད་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྲུབ།

The existence or the non-existence of the self is not established in any way. Without that, how can the existence or the non-existence of defilements be established?

kasyaciddhi bhavantīme kleśāḥ sa ca na sidhyati|

kaścidāho vinā kaṁcitsanti kleśā na kasyacit||4||

誰有此煩惱　　是即為不成

若離是而有　　煩惱則無屬

།ཉོན་མོངས་དེ་དག་གང་གི་ཡིན། །དེ་ཡང་གྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །འགའ་མེད་ པར་ནི་གང་གི་ཡང༌། །ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དག་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

These dcflements, indeed, belong to someone. Yet, such a person is not established. In other words, in the absence of anyone, these defilements seem to exist without belonging to anyone.

svakāyadṛṣṭivat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā|

svakāyadṛṣṭivat kliṣṭaṁ kleśeṣvapi na pañcadhā||5||

如身見五種　　求之不可得

煩惱於垢心　　五求亦不得

།རང་ལུས་ལྟ་བཞིན་ཉོན་མོངས་རྣམས། །ཉོན་མོངས་ཅན་ལ་རྣམ་ལྔར་མེད། །རང་ལུས་ལྟ་བཞིན་ཉོན་མོངས་ཅན། །ཉོན་མོངས་པ་ལ་རྣམ་ལྔར་མེད།

The defhents are like the view of one's own personality. Within the defiled, they are not found in the fivefold way. The defiled is like the view of one's own personality, for even within the defilements it is not found in the fivefold way.

svabhāvato na vidyante śubhāśubhaviparyayāḥ|

pratītya katamān kleśāḥ śubhāśubhaviparyayān||6||

淨不淨顛倒　　是則無自性

云何因此二　　而生諸煩惱

།སྡུག་དང་མི་སྡུག་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག །རང་བཞིན་ལས་ནི་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །སྡུག་དང་མི་སྡུག་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག། །བརྟེན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་གང་དག་ཡིན།

The perversions regarding the pleasant and the unpleasant are not evident from the standpoint of self-nature. Depending upon which perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant are these defilements?

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāśca ṣaḍvidham|

vastu rāgasya dveṣasya[1] mohasya ca vikalpyate||7||

色聲香味觸　　及法為六種

如是之六種　　是三毒根本

།གཟུགས་སྒྲ་རོ་དང་རེག་པ་དང༌། །དྲི་དང་ཆོས་དག་རྣམ་དྲུག་ནི། །གཞི་སྟེ་འདོད་ཆགས་ཞེ་སྡང་དང༌། །གཏི་མུག་གི་ནི་ཡིན་པར་བརྟགས།

Material form, sound, taste, touch, smell and concepts--these are discriminated as the sixfold foundations of lust, hatred, and confusion.

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāśca kevalāḥ|

gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṁnibhāḥ||8||

色聲香味觸　　及法體六種

皆空如炎夢　　如乾闥婆城

།གཟུགས་སྒྲ་རོ་དང་རེག་པ་དང༌། །དྲི་དང་ཆོས་དག་ འབའ་ཞིག་སྟེ། །དྲི་ཟའི་གྲོང་ཁྱེར་ལྟ་བུ་དང༌། །སྨིག་རྒྱུ་རྨི་ལམ་འདྲ་བ་ཡིན།

Material form, sound, taste, touch smell as well as concepts- all these are comparable to the city of the gandharvas and resemble mirages and dreams.

aśubhaṁ vā śubhaṁ vāpi kutasteṣu bhaviṣyati|

māyāpuruṣakalpeṣu pratibimbasameṣu ca||9||

如是六種中　　何有淨不淨

猶如幻化人　　亦如鏡中像

།སྒྱུ་མའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ལྟ་བུ་དང༌། །གཟུགས་བརྙན་འདྲ་བ་དེ་དག་ལ། །སྡུག་པ་དང་ནི་མི་སྡུག་པ། །འབྱུང་བར་ཡང་ནི་ག་ལ་འགྱུར།

How can the pleasant and the unpleasant come to be in people who are fabrications of illusion or who are comparable to mirror images?

anapekṣya śubhaṁ nāstyaśubhaṁ prajñapayemahi|

yatpratītya śubhaṁ tasmācchubhaṁ naivopapadyate||10||

不因於淨相　　則無有不淨

因淨有不淨　　是故無不淨

།གང་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྡུག་པ་ཞེས། །གདགས་པར་བྱ་བ་མི་སྡུག་པ། །སྡུག་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་ཡོད་མིན་པས། །དེ་ཕྱིར་སྡུག་པ་འཐད་མ་ཡིན།

We make known that the unpleasant does not exist without being contingent upon the pleasant, and that the pleasant, in its turn, is dependent upon that [i.e. the unpleasant]. Therefote, the pleasant [in itselfj is not appropriate.

anapekṣyāśubhaṁ nāsti śubhaṁ prajñapayemahi|

yatpratītyāśubhaṁ tasmādaśubhaṁ naiva vidyate||11||

不因於不淨　　則亦無有淨

因不淨有淨　　是故無有淨

།གང་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་མི་སྡུག་པར། །གདགས་པར་བྱ་བ་སྡུག་པ་ནི། །མི་སྡུག་མི་སྟོས་ཡོད་མིན་པས། །དེ་ཕྱིར་མི་སྡུག་འཐད་མ་ཡིན།

We make known that the pleasant does not exist without being contingent upon the unpleasant, and that the unpleasant, in its turn, is dependent upon that [i.e., the pleasant]. Therefore, the unpleasant [in itself] is not evident.

avidyamāne ca śubhe kuto rāgo bhaviṣyati|

aśubhe'vidyamāne ca kuto dveṣo bhaviṣyati||12||

若無有淨者　　何由而有貪

若無有不淨　　何由而有恚

།སྡུག་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །འདོད་ཆགས་ཡོད་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། །མི་སྡུག་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །ཞེ་སྡང་ཡོད་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར།

When the pleasant is not evident, whence can there be lust?

When the unpleasant is not evident, whence can there be hatred?

anitye nityamityevaṁ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ|

nānityaṁ vidyate śūnye kuto grāho viparyayaḥ||13||

於無常著常　　是則名顛倒

空中無有常　　何處有常倒

།གལ་ཏེ་མི་རྟག་རྟག་པ་ཞེས། །དེ་ལྟར་འཛིན་པ་ལོག་ཡིན་ན། །སྟོང་ལ་མི་རྟག་ཡོད་མིན་པས། །འཛིན་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་ལོག་པ་ཡིན།

If there were to be grasping on to the view, "What is impermanent is permanent," then there is perversion. The impermanent is not evident in the context of the empty. How can there be grasping or perversion?

anitye nityamityevaṁ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ|

anityamityapi grāhaḥ śūnye kiṁ na viparyayaḥ||14||

若於無常中　　著無常非倒

空中無無常　　何有非顛倒

།གལ་ཏེ་མི་རྟག་རྟག་གོ་ཞེས། །དེ་ལྟར་འཛིན་པ་ལོག་ཡིན་ན། །སྟོང་ལ་མི་རྟག་ པའོ་ཞེས། །འཛིན་པའང་ཇི་ལྟར་ལོག་མ་ཡིན།

If pasping on to the view, "What is irnpcrmnent is permanent," is perversion, how is it that even the grasping after the view, "What is empty is impermanent," does not constitute a perversion?

yena gṛṇhāti yo grāho grahītā yacca gṛhyate|

upaśāntāni sarvāṇi tasmādgrāho na vidyate||15||

可著著者著　　及所用著法

是皆寂滅相　　云何而有著

།གང་གིས་འཛིན་དང་འཛིན་གང་དང༌། །འཛིན་པ་པོ་དང་གང་གཟུང་བ། །ཐམས་ཅད་ཉེ་བར་ཞི་བ་སྟེ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་འཛིན་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

That through which there is grasping, whatever grasping there is. The grasper as well as that which is grasped-all these are appeased. Therefore, no grasping is evident.

avidyamāne grāhe ca mithyā vā samyageva vā|

bhavedviparyayaḥ kasya bhavetkasyāviparyayaḥ||16||

若無有著法　　言邪是顛倒

言正不顛倒　　誰有如是事

།ལོག་པའམ་ཡང་དག་ཉིད་དུ་ནི། །འཛིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །གང་ལ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཡོད་ཅིང༌། གང་ལ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་ཡོད།

When gasping, wrongly or rightly, is not evident, for whom would there be perversion and for whom would there be non-perversion?

na cāpi viparītasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ|

na cāpyaviparītasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ||17||

有倒不生倒　　無倒不生倒

倒者不生倒　　不倒亦不生

།ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པ་ལ། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དག་མི་སྲིད་དེ། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་མ་གྱུར་ལ། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དག་མི་སྲིད་དེ།

Perversions do not occur to one who is already subjected to perversion.

Perversions do not occur to one who has not been subjected to perversion.

na viparyasyamānasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ|

vimṛśasva svayaṁ kasya saṁbhavanti viparyayāḥ||18||

若於顛倒時　　亦不生顛倒

汝可自觀察　　誰生於顛倒

།ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་བཞིན་ལ། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དག་མི་སྲིད་དེ། །གང་ལ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་སྲིད་པ། །བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱོད།

Perversions do not occur to one who is being subjected to perversions.

Reflect on your own! To whom will the perversions occur?

anutpannāḥ kathaṁ nāma bhaviṣyanti viparyayāḥ|

viparyayeṣvajāteṣu viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ||19||

諸顛倒不生　　云何有此義

無有顛倒故　　何有顛倒者

།ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་རྣམས་མ་སྐྱེས་ན། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ན་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་མེད་ན། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅན་ག་ལ་ཡོད།

How could there be non-arisen perversions? When perversion are not born, whence can there be a person who is subjected to perversions?

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate|

na svataḥ parataśceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ||20||[2]

།དངོས་པོ་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། །གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན། །བདག་དང་གཞན་ལས་ཀྱང་མིན་ན། །ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཅན་ག་ལ་ཡོད།

An existent does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from another, nor both itself and other. If so, whence can there be a person who is subject to perversions?

ātmā ca śuci nityaṁ ca sukhaṁ ca yadi vidyate|

ātmā ca śuci nityaṁ ca sukhaṁ ca na viparyayaḥ||21||

若常我樂淨　　而是實有者

是常我樂淨　　則非是顛倒

།གལ་ཏེ་བདག་དང་གཙང་བ་དང༌། །རྟག་དང་བདེ་བ་ཡོད་ན་ནི། །བདག་དང་གཙང་དང་རྟག་པ་དང༌། །བདེ་བ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་མ་ཡིན།

If either the self, the pleasant, the permanent, or the happy is evident, then neither the self, the pleasant, the permanent, nor the happy constitutes a perversion.

nātmā ca śuci nityaṁ ca sukhaṁ ca yadi vidyate|

anātmāśucyanityaṁ ca naiva duḥkhaṁ ca vidyate||22||

若常我樂淨　　而實無有者

無常苦不淨　　是則亦應無

།གལ་ཏེ་བདག་དང་གཙང་བ་དང༌། །རྟག་དང་བདེ་བ་མེད་ན་ནི། །བདག་མེད་མི་གཙང་མི་རྟག་དང༌། །སྡུག་བསྔལ་ ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

If neither the self, the pleasant, the permanent, nor the happy is not evident, then neither the non-self, the unpleasant, the impermanent, nor the suffering would also be evident.

evaṁ nirudhyate'vidyā viparyayanirodhanāt|

avidyāyāṁ niruddhāyāṁ saṁskārādyaṁ nirudhyate||23||

如是顛倒滅　　無明則亦滅

以無明滅故　　諸行等亦滅

།དེ་ལྟར་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་འགགས་པས། །མ་རིག་པ་ནི་འགག་པར་འགྱུར། །མ་རིག་འགགས་པར་གྱུར་ན་ནི། །འདུ་བྱེད་ལ་སོགས་འགག་པར་འགྱུར།

Thus, with the cessgtion of perversions, ignorance cases. When ignorance has ceased, the dispositions, etc. come to cease.

yadi bhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ keciddhi kasyacit|

kathaṁ nāma prahīyeran kaḥ svabhāvaṁ prahāsyati||24||

若煩惱性實　　而有所屬者

云何當可斷　　誰能斷其性

།གལ་ཏེ་ལ་ལའི་ཉོན་མོངས་པ། །གང་དག་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ཡོད་ན། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ ན་སྤོང་བར་འགྱུར། །ཡོད་པ་སུ་ཞིག་སྤོང་བར་བྱེད།

If, indeed, certain defilments of someone have come to be on the basis of self-nature, how could they be relinquished? Who ever could relinquish self-nature?

yadyabhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ keciddhi kasyacit|

kathaṁ nāma prahīyeran ko'sadbhāvaṁ prahāsyati||25||

若煩惱虛妄　　無性無屬者

云何當可斷　　誰能斷無性

།གལ་ཏེ་ལ་ལའི་ཉོན་མོངས་པ། །གང་དག་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་མེད་ན། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ན་སྤོང་བར་འགྱུར། །མེད་པ་སུ་ཞིག་སྤོང་བར་བྱེད།

།ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉི་ཤུ་གསུམ་པའོ།། །།

If, indeed, certain defilements of someone have not come to be on the basis of self-nature, how could they be relinquished! Who ever could relinquish non-existence?

24. āryasatyaparīkṣā caturviṁśatitamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀四諦品第二十四

yadi śūnyamidaṁ sarvamudayo nāsti na vyayaḥ|

caturṇāmāryasatyānāmabhāvaste prasajyate||1||

若一切皆空　　無生亦無滅

如是則無有　　四聖諦之法

།། གལ་ཏེ་འདི་དག་ཀུན་སྟོང་ན། །འབྱུང་བ་མེད་ཅིང་འཇིག་པ་མེད། །འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ་བཞི་པོ་རྣམས། །ཁྱོད་ལ་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

If all this is empty, then there exists no uprising and ceasing. These imply the non-existence of the four noble truth,

parijñā ca prahāṇaṁ ca bhāvanā sākṣikarma ca|

caturṇāmāryasatyānāmabhāvānnopapadyate||2||

以無四諦故　　見苦與斷集

證滅及修道　　如是事皆無

།འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ་བཞི་མེད་པས། །ཡོངས་སུ་ཤེས་དང་སྤོང་བ་དང༌། །སྒོམ་དང་མངོན་དུ་བྱ་བ་དག། །འཐད་པར་འགྱུར་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

In the absence of the four noble truths, understanding, relinquishing, cultivation, and realization will not be appropriate.

tadabhāvānna vidyante catvāryāryaphalāni ca|

phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakāḥ||3||

以是事無故　　則無四道果

無有四果故　　得向者亦無

།དེ་དག་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས། །འབྲས་བུ་བཞི་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །འབྲས་བུ་མེད་ན་འབྲས་གནས་མེད། །ཞུགས་པ་དག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

In the absense of this [fourfold activity], the four noble fruits would not be evident. In the absence of the fruits, neither those who have attained the fruits nor those who have reached the way [to such attainment] exist.

saṁgho nāsti na cetsanti te'ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ|

abhāvāccāryasatyānāṁ saddharmo'pi na vidyate||4||

若無八賢聖　　則無有僧寶

以無四諦故　　亦無有法寶

།གལ་ཏེ་སྐྱེས་བུ་གང་ཟག་བརྒྱད། །དེ་དག་མེད་ན་དགེ་འདུན་མེད། །འཕགས་པའི་ བདེན་རྣམས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

If the eight types of individuals do not exist, there will be no congregation.

From the non-existence of the noble truths, the true doctrine would also not be evident.

dharme cāsati saṁghe ca kathaṁ buddho bhaviṣyati|

evaṁ trīṇyapi ratnāni brūvāṇaḥ pratibādhase||5||

以無法僧寶　　亦無有佛寶

如是說空者　　是則破三寶

།ཆོས་དང་དགེ་འདུན་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །སངས་རྒྱས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །དེ་སྐད་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་སྨྲ་ན། །དཀོན་མཆོག་གསུམ་ལ་གནོད་པ་ནི།

When the doctrine and the congregation are non-existent, how can there

be an enlightennd one? Speaking in this manner about emptiness, you

contradict the three jewels,

śūnyatāṁ phalasadbhāvamadharmaṁ dharmameva ca|

sarvasaṁvyavahārāṁśca laukikān pratibādhase||6||

空法壞因果　　亦壞於罪福

亦復悉毀壞　　一切世俗法

།བྱེད་ཅིང་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པ་དང༌། །ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པ་ ཆོས་ཉིད་དང༌། །འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ཡི་ཐ་སྙད་ནི། །ཀུན་ལའང་གནོད་པ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན།

as well as the reaity of the fruits, both good and bad, alld all such worldly conventions.

atra brūmaḥ śūnyatāyāṁ na tvaṁ vetsi prayojanam|

śūnyatāṁ śūnyatārthaṁ ca tata evaṁ vihanyase||7||

汝今實不能　　知空空因緣

及知於空義　　是故自生惱

།དེ་ལ་བཤད་པ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ནི། །སྟོང་ཉིད་དགོས་དང་སྟོང་ཉིད་དང༌། །སྟོང་ཉིད་དོན་ནི་མ་རྟོགས་པས། །དེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་གནོད་པ་ཡིན།

We say that you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such, you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness.

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṁ dharmadeśanā|

lokasaṁvṛtisatyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthataḥ||8||

諸佛依二諦　　為眾生說法

一以世俗諦　　二第一義諦

།སངས་རྒྱས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་བསྟན་པ། །བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ལ་ཡང་དག་བརྟེན། །འཇིག་རྟེན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་དང༌། །དམ་པའི་དོན་གྱི་བདེན་པའོ།

The reaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths:

truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit.

ye'nayorna vijānanti vibhāgaṁ satyayordvayoḥ|

te tattvaṁ na vijānanti gambhīraṁ buddhaśāsane||9||

若人不能知　　分別於二諦

則於深佛法　　不知真實義

།གང་དག་བདེན་པ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི། །རྣམ་དབྱེ་རྣམ་པར་མི་ཤེས་པ། །དེ་དག་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྟན་པ་ནི། །ཟབ་མོའི་དེ་ཉིད་རྣམ་མི་ཤེས།

Those who do not understand the distinction bemeen these two truths do not understand the profound truth embodied in the Buddha's message.

vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate|

paramārthamanāgamya nirvāṇaṁ nādhigamyate||10||

若不依俗諦　　不得第一義

不得第一義　　則不得涅槃

། ཐ་སྙད་ལ་ནི་མ་བརྟེན་པར། །དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་བསྟན་མི་ནུས། །དམ་པའི་དོན་ནི་མ་རྟོགས་པར། །མྱ་ངན་འདས་པ་ཐོབ་མི་འགྱུར།

Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught.

Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained.

vināśayati durdṛṣṭā śūnyatā mandamedhasam|

sarpo yathā durgṛhīto vidyā vā duṣprasādhitā||11||

不能正觀空　　鈍根則自害

如不善呪術　　不善捉毒蛇

།སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་བལྟ་ཉེས་ན། །ཤེས་རབ་ཆུང་རྣམས་ཕུང་བར་འགྱུར། །ཇི་ལྟར་སྤྲུལ་ལ་གཟུང་ཉེས་དང༌། །རིག་སྔགས་ཉེས་པར་བསྒྲུབས་པ་བཞིན།

A wrongly perceived emptiness ruins a person of meager intelligence.

It is like a snake that is wrongly grasped or knowledge that is wrongly cultivated.

ataśca pratyudāvṛttaṁ cittaṁ deśayituṁ muneḥ|

dharmaṁ matvāsya dharmasya mandairduravagāhatām||12||

世尊知是法　　甚深微妙相

非鈍根所及　　是故不欲說

།དེ་ཕྱིར་ཞན་པས་ཆོས་འདི་ཡི། །གཏིང་རྟོགས་དཀའ་བར་མཁྱེན་གྱུར་ནས། །ཐུབ་པའི་ཐུགས་ནི་ཆོས་བསྟན་ལས། །རབ་ཏུ་ལོག་པར་གྱུར་པ་ཡིན།

Thus, the Sage's (the Buddha's) thought recoiled from teaching the doctrine having reflected upon the difficulty of understanding the doctrine by people of meager intelIigence.

śūnyatāyāmadhilayaṁ yaṁ punaḥ kurute bhavān|

doṣaprasaṅgo nāsmākaṁ sa śūnye nopapadyate||13||

汝謂我著空　　而為我生過

汝今所說過　　於空則無有

།སྐྱོན་དུ་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་ནི། །སྟོང་ལ་འཐད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས། ། ཁྱོད་ནི་སྟོང་ཉིད་སྤོང་བྱེད་པ། །གང་དེ་ང་ལ་མི་འཐད་དོ།

Furthermore, if you were generate any obsession with regard to emptiness, the accompanying error is not ours. That [obsession] is not appropriate in the context of the empty.

sarvaṁ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate|

sarvaṁ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṁ yasya na yujyate||14||

以有空義故　　一切法得成

若無空義者　　一切則不成

།གང་ལ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་རུང་བ། །དེ་ལ་ཐམས་ཅད་རུང་བར་འགྱུར། །གང་ལ་སྟོང་ཉིད་མི་རུང་བ། །དེ་ལ་ཐམས་ཅད་རུང་མི་འགྱུར།

Everything is pertinent for whom emptiness is proper.

Everything is not pertinent form whom the empty is not proper.

sa tvaṁ doṣānātmanīnānasmāsu paripātayan|

aśvamevābhirūḍhaḥ sannaśvamevāsi vismṛtaḥ||15||

汝今自有過　　而以迴向我

如人乘馬者　　自忘於所乘

།ཁྱོད་ནི་རང་གི་སྐྱོན་རྣམས་ནི། །ང་ལ་ཡོངས་སུ་སྒྱུར་བྱེད་པ། །རྟ་ལ་མངོན་པར་ཞོན་བཞིན་དུ། །རྟ་ཉིད་བརྗེད་པར་གྱུར་པ་བཞིན།

You, attributing your own errors to us, are like one who has mounted his horse

and cofused about it.

svabhāvādyadi bhāvānāṁ sadbhāvamanupaśyasi|

ahetupratyayān bhāvāṁstvamevaṁ sati paśyasi||16||

若汝見諸法　　決定有性者

即為見諸法　　無因亦無緣

།གལ་ཏེ་དངོས་རྣམས་རང་བཞིན་ལས། །ཡོད་པར་རྗེས་སུ་ལྟ་བྱེད་ན། །དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ན་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས། །རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་མེད་པར་ཁྱོད་ལྟའོ།

If you perceive the existence of the existents in terms of self-nature, then you will also perceive these existents as non-causal conditions.

kāryaṁ ca kāraṇaṁ caiva kartāraṁ karaṇaṁ kriyām|

utpādaṁ ca nirodhaṁ ca phalaṁ ca pratibādhase||17||

即為破因果　　作作者作法

亦復壞一切　　萬物之生滅

།འབྲས་བུ་དང་ནི་རྒྱུ་ཉིད་དང༌། །བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་བྱེད་དང་བྱ༑ །སྐྱེ་བ་དང་ནི་འགག་པ་དང༌། །འབྲས་བུ་ལ་ཡང་གནོད་པ་བྱེད།

You will also contradict [the notions of] effect, cause, agent, performance of action, activity, arising, ceasing, as well as fruit.

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe|

sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamā||18||

眾因緣生法　　我說即是無

亦為是假名　　亦是中道義

།རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་གང༌། །དེ་ནི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བཤད། །དེ་ནི་བརྟེན་ནས་གདགས་པ་སྟེ། །དེ་ཉིད་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ཡིན་ནོ།

We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path.

apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate|

yasmāttasmādaśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate||19||

未曾有一法　　不從因緣生

是故一切法　　無不是空者

།གང་ཕྱིར་རྟེན་འབྱུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི། །ཆོས་འགའ་ ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་སྟོང་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི། །ཆོས་འགའ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

A thing that is not dependently arisen is not evident. For that reason, a thing that is non-empty is indeed not evident.

yadyaśūnyamidaṁ sarvamudayo nāsti na vyayaḥ|

caturṇāmāryasatyānāmabhāvaste prasajyate||20||

若一切不空　　則無有生滅

如是則無有　　四聖諦之法

།གལ་ཏེ་འདི་ཀུན་མི་སྟོང་ན། །འབྱུང་བ་མེད་ཅིང་འཇིག་པ་མེད། །འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ་བཞི་པོ་རྣམས། །ཁྱོད་ལ་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

If all this is non-empty, there exists no uprising and ceasing.

These imply the non-existence of the four noble truths.

apratītya samutpannaṁ kuto duḥkhaṁ bhaviṣyati|

anityamuktaṁ duḥkhaṁ hi tatsvābhāvye na vidyate||21||

苦不從緣生　　云何當有苦

無常是苦義　　定性無無常

།རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་འབྱུང་མ་ཡིན་ན། །སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཡོད་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར། །མི་རྟག་སྡུག་བསྔལ་གསུངས་པ་དེ། །རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་ལ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

How can there be suffering that is not dependently arisen? Suffering has, indeed, been described as impermanent. As such, it is not evident in terms of self-nature.

svabhāvato vidyamānaṁ kiṁ punaḥ samudeṣyate|

tasmātsamudayo nāsti śūnyatāṁ pratibādhataḥ||22||

若苦有定性　　何故從集生

是故無有集　　以破空義故

།རང་བཞིན་ལས་ནི་ཡོད་ཡིན་ན། །ཅི་ཞིག་ཀུན་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར། །དེ་ཕྱིར་སྟོང་ཉིད་གནོད་བྱེད་ལ། །ཀུན་འབྱུང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

How can that which is evident in terms of self-nature rise again?

Therefore, for one who contradicts emptiness, there exists no [conception of] arising.

na nirodhaḥ svabhāvena sato duḥkhasya vidyate|

svabhāvaparyavasthānānnirodhaṁ pratibādhase||23||

苦若有定性　　則不應有滅

汝著定性故　　即破於滅諦

།སྡུག་བསྔལ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ཡོད་ན། །འགོག་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ནི་ཡོངས་གནས་ཕྱིར། །འགོག་ལ་གནོད་པ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན།

The cessation of suffering that exists in terms of self-nature is not evident.

You contradict cessation by adhering to a notion of self-nature.

svābhāvye sati mārgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate|

athāsau bhāvyate mārgaḥ svābhāvyaṁ te na vidyate||24||

苦若有定性　　則無有修道

若道可修習　　即無有定性

།ལམ་ལ་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་ན་ནི། །སྒོམ་པ་འཐད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཅི་སྟེ་ལམ་དེ་བསྒོམ་བྱ་ན། །ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན༑

When self-nature exist, the cultivation of the path is not appropriate. And if the path were to be cultivated, then no self-nature assodated with it [i.e. the path] will be evident.

yadā duḥkhaṁ samudayo nirodhaśca na vidyate|

mārgo duḥkhanirodhatvāt katamaḥ prāpayiṣyati||25||

若無有苦諦　　及無集滅諦

所可滅苦道　　竟為何所至

།གང་ཚེ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་ཀུན་འབྱུང་དང༌། །འགོག་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །ལམ་གྱི་སྡུག་བསྔལ་འགོག་པ་ནི། །གང་ཞིག་ཐོབ་པར་འགྱུར་པར་འདོད།

When suffering as well as its arising and ceasing are not evident, through the cessation of suffering where will the path lead to?

svabhāvenāparijñānaṁ yadi tasya punaḥ katham|

parijñānaṁ nanu kila svabhāvaḥ samavasthitaḥ||26||

若苦定有性　　先來所不見

於今云何見　　其性不異故

།གལ་ཏེ་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི། །ཡོངས་སུ་ཤེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །དེ་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོངས་ཤེས་འགྱུར། །རང་བཞིན་གནས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ།

If non-understanding is due to self-nature, how can one come to passess understanding subsequently. Is it not the case that self-nature is fixed?

prahāṇasākṣātkaraṇe bhāvanā caivameva te|

parijñāvanna yujyante catvāryapi phalāni ca||27||

如見苦不然　　斷集及證滅

修道及四果　　是亦皆不然

།དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ནི་ཁྱོད་ཉིད་ཀྱི། །སྤང་དང་མངོན་དུ་བྱ་བ་དང༌། །བསྒོམ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་བཞི་དག་ཀྱང༌། །ཡོངས་ཤེས་བཞིན་དུ་མི་རུང་ངོ༌།

As in the case of understanding, this [i.e., the explanation in terms of self nature] is not proper in relation to the activities of relinquishing, realizing is well as cultivating. And so world the four fruits be [improper].

svabhāvenānadhigataṁ yatphalaṁ tatpunaḥ katham|

śakyaṁ samadhigantuṁ syātsvabhāvaṁ parigṛhṇataḥ||28||

是四道果性　　先來不可得

諸法性若定　　今云何可得

།རང་བཞིན་ཡོངས་སུ་འཛིན་པ་ཡིས། །འབྲས་བུ་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི། །ཐོབ་པ་མིན་པ་གང་ཡིན་དེ། །ཇི་ལྟར་འཐོབ་པར་ནུས་པར་འགྱུར།

How could it be possible for a prson, who upholds a theory of self-nature, to realze a fruit that has already been realized though self-nature?

phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakāḥ|

saṁgho nāsti na cetsanti te'ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ||29||

若無有四果　　則無得向者

以無八聖故　　則無有僧寶

།འབྲས་བུ་མེད་ན་འབྲས་གནས་མེད། །ཞུགས་པ་དག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །གལ་ཏེ་སྐྱེས་བུ་གང་ཟག་བརྒྱད། །དེ་དག་མེད་ན་དགེ་འདུན་མེད།

In the absence of the fruits, there are neither those who have attained the fruits nor those who have reached the way [to such attainment]. If the eight types of individuals do not exists, there will be no congregation.

abhāvāccāryasatyānāṁ saddharmo'pi na vidyate|

dharme cāsati saṁghe ca kathaṁ buddho bhaviṣyati||30||

無四聖諦故　　亦無有法寶

無法寶僧寶　　云何有佛寶

།འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་རྣམས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །དམ་པའི་ ཆོས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །ཆོས་དང་དགེ་འདུན་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །སངས་རྒྱས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར།

From the non-existence of the noble truths, the true doctrine would also not be evident. In the absence of the doctrine and the congregation, how can there be an enlightened one?

apratītyāpi bodhiṁ ca tava buddhaḥ prasajyate|

apratītyāpi buddhaṁ ca tava bodhiḥ prasajyate||31||

汝說則不因　　菩提而有佛

亦復不因佛　　而有於菩提

།ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་སངས་རྒྱས་བྱང་ཆུབ་ལ། །མ་བརྟེན་པར་ཡང་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར། །ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་བྱང་ཆུབ་སངས་རྒྱས་ལ། །མ་བརྟེན་པར་ཡང་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

Your [conception of the] enlightened one implies an independent enlightenment. Also, your [conception ofl enlightenment implies an independent enlightened one.

yaścābuddhaḥ svabhāvena sa bodhāya ghaṭannapi|

na bodhisattvacaryāyāṁ bodhiṁ te'dhigamiṣyati||32||

雖復勤精進　　修行菩提道

若先非佛性　　不應得成佛

།ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི། །སངས་རྒྱས་མིན་པ་གང་ཡིན་དེས། །བྱང་ཆུབ་སྤྱོད་ལ་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཕྱིར། །བརྩལ་ཀྱང་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཐོབ་མི་འགྱུར།

Whosoever is by self-nature unenlightened, even though he were to contend with enlightenment, would not attain enlightenment though a career off a bodhisattva.

na ca dharmamadharmaṁ vā kaścijjātu kariṣyati|

kimaśūnyasya kartavyaṁ svabhāvaḥ kriyate na hi||33||

若諸法不空　　無作罪福者

不空何所作　　以其性定故

།འགའ་ཡང་ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་མིན་པ། །ནམ་ཡང་བྱེད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ། །མི་སྟོང་པ་ལ་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ། །རང་བཞིན་ལ་ནི་བྱ་བ་མེད།

No one will, indeed, do good or bad. What could the non-empty do?

For, self-nature does not perform.

vinā dharmamadharmaṁ ca phalaṁ hi tava vidyate|

dharmādharmanimittaṁ ca phalaṁ tava na vidyate||34||

汝於罪福中　　不生果報者

是則離罪福　　而有諸果報

།ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་མིན་མེད་པར་ཡང༌། །འབྲས་བུ་ཁྱོད་ལ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་མིན་རྒྱུས་བྱུང་བའི། །འབྲས་བུ་ཁྱོད་ལ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

As for you, the fruit would be evident even without good or bad. This means that for you a fruit occasioned by good and bad would not be evident.

dharmādharmanimittaṁ vā yadi te vidyate phalam|

dharmādharmasamutpannamaśūnyaṁ te kathaṁ phalam||35||

若謂從罪福　　而生果報者

果從罪福生　　云何言不空

།ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་མིན་རྒྱུས་བྱུང་བའི། །འབྲས་བུ་གལ་ཏེ་ཁྱོད་ལ་ཡོད། །ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་མིན་ལས་བྱུང་བའི། །འབྲས་བུ་ཅི་ཕྱིར་སྟོང་མ་ཡིན།

If, on the contrary, a fruit occasioned by good or bad is evident to you. How can you maintain the fruit that has arisen from good or bad to be [at the sametime] non-empty?

sarvasaṁvyavahārāṁśca laukikān pratibādhase|

yatpratītyasamutpādaśūnyatāṁ pratibādhase||36||

汝破一切法　　諸因緣空義

則破於世俗　　諸餘所有法

།རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་ཡི། །སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་གནོད་བྱེད་གང༌། །འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ཡི་ཐ་སྙད་ནི། །ཀུན་ལ་གནོད་པ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན།

You will contradict all the worldly conventions when you contradict the emptiness associated with dependent arising.

na kartavyaṁ bhavetkiṁcidanārabdhā bhavetkriyā|

kārakaḥ syādakurvāṇaḥ śūnyatāṁ pratibādhataḥ||37||

若破於空義　　即應無所作

無作而有作　　不作名作者

།སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལ་གནོད་བྱེད་ན། །བྱ་བ་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །རྩོམ་པ་མེད་པ་བྱ་བར་འགྱུར། །མི་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་བྱེད་པོར་འགྱུར།

For one who contradicts emptiness there would be nothing that ought to be done; activity would be uninitiated and an agent would be non-acting.

ajātamaniruddhaṁ ca kūṭasthaṁ ca bhaviṣyati|

vicitrābhiravasthābhiḥ svabhāve rahitaṁ jagat||38||

若有決定性　　世間種種相

則不生不滅　　常住而不壞

།རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་ན་འགྲོ་བ་རྣམས། །མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་དང༌། །ཐེར་ཟུག་ཏུ་ནི་གནས་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །གནས་སྐབས་སྣ་ཚོགས་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར།

In a substantialist view, the universe will be unborn, non-ceased, remaining immutable and devoid of variegated states.

asaṁprāptasya ca prāptirduḥkhaparyantakarma ca|

sarvakleśaprahāṇaṁ ca yadyaśūnyaṁ na vidyate||39||

若無有空者　　未得不應得

亦無斷煩惱　　亦無苦盡事

།གལ་ཏེ་སྟོང་པ་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །མ་ཐོབ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང༌། །སྡུག་བསྔལ་མཐར་བྱེད་ལས་དང་ནི། །ཉོན་མོངས་ཐམས་ཅད་སྤོང་བའང་མེད།

If the non-empty [is evident], then reaching up to what has not been reached, the act of terminating suffering as well as the rehnquishng of all defilements would not be evident.

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṁ paśyatīdaṁ sa paśyati|

duḥkhaṁ samudayaṁ caiva nirodhaṁ mārgameva ca||40||

是故經中說　　若見因緣法

則為能見佛　　見苦集滅道

།གང་གིས་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང༌། །མཐོང་བ་དེ་ནི་སྡུག་བསྔལ་དང༑ །ཀུན་འབྱུང་དང་ནི་འགོག་པ་དང༌། །ལམ་ཉིད་དེ་དག་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན།

།འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉི་ཤུ་བཞི་པའོ།

Whoever perceives dependent arising also perceives suffering, its arising, its ceasing and the path [leading to its ceasing].

19. kālaparīkṣā ekonaviṁśatitamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀時品第十九

pratyutpanno'nāgataśca yadyatītamapekṣya hi|

pratyutpanno'nāgataśca kāle'tīte bhaviṣyataḥ||1||

若因過去時　　有未來現在

未來及現在　　應在過去時

།།ད་ལྟར་བྱུང་དང་མ་འོངས་པ། །གལ་ཏེ་འདས་ལ་ལྟོས་གྱུར་ན། །ད་ལྟར་བྱུང་དང་མ་འོངས་པ། །འདས་པའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར།

If the present and the future exist contingent upon the pat, then the present and the future would be in the past time.

pratyutpanno'nāgataśca na stastatra punaryadi|

pratyutpanno'nāgataśca syātāṁ kathamapekṣya tam||2||

若過去時中　　無未來現在

未來現在時　　云何因過去

།ད་ལྟར་བྱུང་དང་མ་འོངས་པ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ན་མེད་གྱུར་ན། །ད་ལྟར་བྱུང་དང་མ་འོངས་པ། །ཇི་ལྟར་དེ་ལ་ལྟོས་པར་འགྱུར།

Again, if the present and the future were not to exist therein [i. e., in the past], how could the present and the future be contingent upon that?

anapekṣya punaḥ siddhirnātītaṁ vidyate tayoḥ|

pratyutpanno'nāgataśca tasmātkālo na vidyate||3||

不因過去時　　則無未來時

亦無現在時　　是故無二時

།འདས་པ་ལ་ནི་མ་ལྟོས་པར། །དེ་གཉིས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །དེ་ཕྱིར་ད་ལྟར་བྱུང་བ་དང༌། །མ་འོངས་དུས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

Moreover, non-contingent upon the past, theit [i.e. of the prerent and future] establishment is not evident. Therefore, neither a present nor a future time is evident.

etenai vāvaśiṣṭau dvau krameṇa parivartakau|

uttamādhamamadhyādīnekatvādīṁśca lakṣayet||4||

以如是義故　　則知餘二時

上中下一異　　是等法皆無

།རིམ་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི་འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱིས། །ལྷག་མ་གཉིས་པོ་བསྣོར་བ་དང༌། །མཆོག་དང་ཐ་མ་འབྲིང་ལ་སོགས། །གཅིག་ལ་སོགས་པའང་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།

Following the same method, the remaining two periods of [time] as well as related concepts such as the highest, the lowest and the middle, and also identity, etc. should be characterized.

nāsthito gṛhyate kālaḥ sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate|

yo gṛhyetāgṛhītaśca kālaḥ prajñapyate katham||5||

時住不可得　　時去亦叵得

時若不可得　　云何說時相

།མི་གནས་དུས་ནི་འཛིན་མི་བྱེད།།གང་ཞིག་གཟུང་བར་བྱ་བའི་དུས། །གནས་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས། །མ་བཟུང་དུས་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་གདགས།

A non-static time is not observed, A static time is not evident, Even if the unobserved time were to be observed, how can it' be made known?

bhāvaṁ pratītya kālaścetkālo bhāvādṛte kutaḥ|

na ca kaścana bhāvo'sti kutaḥ kālo bhaviṣyati||6||

因物故有時　　離物何有時

物尚無所有　　何況當有時

།གལ་ཏེ་དུས་ནི་དངོས་བརྟེན་ཏེ།།དངོས་མེད་དུས་ནི་ག་ལ་ཡོད།།དངོས་པོ་འགའ་ཡང་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །དུས་ལྟ་ཡོད་ པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར།

།དུས་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་བཅུ་དགུ་པའོ།།

If it is assumed that time exists depending upon an existent, how can there be time without an existent? No existent with whatsoever found to exist. Where can time be?

20. sāmagrīparīkṣā viṁśatitamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀因果品第二十

hetośca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi|

phalamasti ca sāmagryāṁ sāmagryā jāyate katham||1||

若眾緣和合　　而有果生者

和合中已有　　何須和合生

།།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ཀྱི། །ཚོགས་པ་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །ཚོགས་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་ན་ནི། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཚོགས་པ་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ།

If the effect were to arise from a harmony of cause and conditions, and if it were to exist in the harmony, how can it arise from the harmony?

hetośca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi|

phalaṁ nāsti ca sāmagryāṁ sāmagryā jāyate katham||2||

若眾緣和合　　是中無果者

云何從眾緣　　和合而果生

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ཀྱི། །ཚོགས་པ་ཉིད་ ལས་སྐྱེ་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །ཚོགས་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་མེད་ན་ནི། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཚོགས་པ་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ།

If the effect were to arise from a harmony of cause and conditions and if it were not to exist in the harmony, how can it arise from the harmony?

hetośca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmagryāmasti cetphalam|

gṛhyeta nanu sāmagryāṁ sāmagryāṁ ca na gṛhyate||3||

若眾緣和合　　是中有果者

和合中應有　　而實不可得

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ཀྱི། །ཚོགས་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་ན་ནི། །ཚོགས་ལ་གཟུང་དུ་ཡོད་རིགས་ན། །ཚོགས་པ་ཉིད་ལ་གཟུང་དུ་མེད།

If it is assumed that the effect exists in the harmony of cause and conditions, should it not be observed in the harmony? However, it is not observed in the harmony.

hetośca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmagryāṁ nāsti cetphalam|

hetavaḥ pratyayāśca syurahetupratyayaiḥ samāḥ||4||

若眾緣和合　　是中無果者

是則眾因緣　　與非因緣同

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་རྣམས་ཀྱི། །ཚོགས་ ལ་འབྲས་བུ་མེད་ན་ནི། །རྒྱུ་རྣམས་དང་ནི་རྐྱེན་དག་ཀྱང༌། །རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་མ་ཡིན་མཚུངས་པར་འགྱུར།

If the effect were not to exist in the harmony of cause and conditions, then the cause and conditions would be comparable to non-cause and non-conditions.

hetukaṁ phalasya dat(t)vā[1] yadi heturnirudhyate|

yaddattaṁ yanniruddhaṁ ca hetorātmadvayaṁ bhavet||5||

若因與果因　　作因已而滅

是因有二體　　一與一則滅

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུས་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ། །རྒྱུ་བྱིན་ནས་ནི་འགག་འགྱུར་ན། །གང་བྱིན་པ་དང་གང་འགགས་པའི། །རྒྱུ་ཡི་བདག་ཉིད་གཉིས་སུ་འགྱུར།

If the cause were to cease having passed on that causal status to the effect, then there would be two forms of the cause: the given and the ceased.

hetuṁ phalasyādatvā ca yadi heturnirudhyate|

hetau niruddhe jātaṁ tatphalamāhetukaṁ bhavet||6||

若因不與果　　作因已而滅

因滅而果生　　是果則無因

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུས་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ། ། རྒྱུ་མ་བྱིན་པར་འགག་འགྱུར་ན། །རྒྱུ་འགགས་ནས་ནི་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡི། །འབྲས་བུ་དེ་དག་རྒྱུ་མེད་འགྱུར།

If the cause were to ease without passing on the causal status to the effect, then the effect that is born when the cause has ceased would be without a cause.

phalaṁ sahaiva sāmagryā yadi prādurbhavetpunaḥ|

ekakālau prasajyete janako yaśca janyate||7||

若眾緣合時　　而有果生者

生者及可生　　則為一時俱

།གལ་ཏེ་ཚོགས་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་ཏུ། །འབྲས་བུ་ཡང་ནི་སྐྱེ་འགྱུར་ན། །སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་དང་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་གང༌། །དུས་གཅིག་པར་ནི་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

If, again, the effect were to appear together with the harmony, then it would follow that the producer and the produce are contemporaneous.

pūrvameva ca sāmagryāḥ phalaṁ prādurbhavedyadi|

hetupratyayanirmuktaṁ phalamāhetukaṁ bhavet||8||

若先有果生　　而後眾緣合

此即離因緣　　名為無因果

།གལ་ཏེ་ཚོགས་པའི་སྔ་རོལ་ དུ༑ །འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེས་པར་གྱུར་ན་ནི། །རྒྱུ་དང་རྐྱེན་རྣམས་མེད་པ་ཡི། །འབྲས་བུ་རྒྱུ་མེད་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར།

If the effect were to appear even prior to the harmony, the effect, distinct from causes and conditions, would be without a cause.

niruddhe cetphalaṁ hetau hetoḥ saṁkramaṇaṁ bhavet|

pūrvajātasya hetośca punarjanma prasajyate||9||

若因變為果　　因即至於果

是則前生因　　生已而復生

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་འགགས་འབྲས་བུ་ན། །རྒྱུ་ནི་ཀུན་ཏུ་འཕོ་བར་འགྱུར། །སྔོན་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡི་རྒྱུ་ཡང་ནི། །ཡང་སྐྱེ་བར་ནི་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

If it is assumed that when the cause has ceased to exist, the effect would become the transformation of the cause, then it follows that there is a rebirth of a cuase that was already born.

janayetphalamutpannaṁ niruddho'staṁgataḥ katham|

tiṣṭhannapi kathaṁ hetuḥ phalena janayedvṛtaḥ||10||

云何因滅失　　而能生於果

又若因在果　　云何因生果

།འགགས་པ་ནུབ་པར་གྱུར་པ་ཡིས། ། འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེད། །འབྲས་བུ་དང་ནི་འབྲེལ་བའི་རྒྱུ། །གནས་པས་ཀྱང་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེད།

How can a cause that has ceased, has reached its end, give rise to an effect that is already arisen? How can a cause, even though enduring, produce an effect, when it is separated from the latter?

athāvṛtaḥ phalenāsau katamajjanayetphalam|

na hyadṛṣṭvā vā dṛṣṭvā vā[2] heturjanayate phalam||11||

若因遍有果　　更生何等果

因見不見果　　是二俱不生

།ཅི་སྟེ་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་མ་འབྲེལ་ན། །འབྲས་བུ་གང་ཞིག་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད། །རྒྱུས་ནི་མཐོང་དང་མ་མཐོང་བར། །འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེད་པར་མི་བྱེད་དོ།

What muse, even if it were not separated from the effect, will give rise to the effect? A cause does not produce an effect either imperceptibly or perceptibly.

nātītasya hyatītena phalasya saha hetunā|

nājātena na jātena saṁgatirjātu vidyate||12||

若言過去因　　而於過去果

未來現在果　　是則終不合

།འབྲས་བུ་འདས་པ་རྒྱུ་འདས་དང༌། །མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་སྐྱེས་པ་དང༌། །ལྷན་ཅིག་ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར་པ་ནི། །ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

Indeed, the assemblage of a past effect with a put or a future or a present cause is not evident.

na jātasya hyajātena phalasya saha hetunā|

nātītena na jātena saṁgatirjātu vidyate||13||

若言現在因　　而於現在果

未來過去果　　是則終不合

།འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེས་པ་རྒྱུ་མ་སྐྱེས། །འདས་པ་དང་ནི་སྐྱེས་པ་དང༌། །ལྷན་ཅིག་ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར་པ་ནི། །ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

Indeed, an assemblage of the present effect with a future or a past or a present cause is not evident.

nājātasya hi jātena phalasya saha hetunā|

nājātena na naṣṭena saṁgatirjātu vidyate||14||[3]

若言未來因　　而於未來果

現在過去果　　是則終不合

།འབྲས་བུ་མ་སྐྱེས་རྒྱུ་སྐྱེས་དང༌། །མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་འདས་པ་དང༌། ། ལྷན་ཅིག་ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ནི། །ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

Indeed, as assemblage of the future effect with a present or a future or a past cause is not evident.

asatyāṁ saṁgatau hetuḥ kathaṁ janayate phalam|

satyāṁ vā saṁgatau hetuḥ kathaṁ janayate phalam||15||

若不和合者　　因何能生果

若有和合者　　因何能生果

།ཕྲད་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །རྒྱུས་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེད། །ཕྲད་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ཡང༌། །རྒྱུས་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེད།

When an assemblage does not exist, how can a cause produce an effcct?

When an assemblage exists, how can a cause produce an effect?

hetuḥ phalena śūnyaścetkathaṁ janayate phalam|

hetuḥ phalenāśūnyaścetkathaṁ janayate phalam||16||

若因空無果　　因何能生果

若因不空果　　因何能生果

།གལ་ཏེ་འབྲས་བུས་སྟོང་པའི་རྒྱུས། །ཇི་ལྟར་འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད། །གལ་ཏེ་འབྲས་བུས་མི་སྟོང་རྒྱུས། །ཇི་ལྟར་འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད།

Hit is assumed that the cause is empty of an effect, how can it praduce an effect? If it is assumed that the cause is not empty of an effect, how can it produce an effect?

phalaṁ notpatsyate'śūnyamaśūnyaṁ na nirotsyate|

aniruddhamanutpannamaśūnyaṁ tadbhaviṣyati||17||

果不空不生　　果不空不滅

以果不空故　　不生亦不滅

།འབྲས་བུ་མི་སྟོང་སྐྱེ་མི་འགྱུར། །མི་སྟོང་འགག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །མི་སྟོང་དེ་ནི་མི་འགགས་དང༌། །མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་པ་ཡིན།

A non-empty effect will not arise; a non-empty effect will not cease.

For, the non-ceased and non-arisen will also be the non-empty.

kathamutpatsyate śūnyaṁ kathaṁ śūnyaṁ nirotsyate|

śūnyamapyaniruddhaṁ tadanutpannaṁ prasajyate||18||

果空故不生　　果空故不滅

以果是空故　　不生亦不滅

།སྟོང་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །སྟོང་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་འགག་པར་འགྱུར། །སྟོང་པ་དེ་ཡང་མ་འགགས་དང༌། །མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཡང་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

How will the empty arise and how will the empty cease?

If something is empty, it follows that it is non-ceased and non-arisen.

hetoḥ phalasya caikatvaṁ na hi jātūpapadyate|

hetoḥ phalasya cānyatvaṁ na hi jātūpapadyate||19||

因果是一者　　是事終不然

因果若異者　　是事亦不然

།རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཅིག་ཉིད་དུ། །ནམ་ཡང་འཐད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཞན་ཉིད་དུ། །ནམ་ཡང་འཐད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།

The identity of cause and effect is indeed not appropriate. The difference between cause and effect is indeed not appropriate.

ekatve phalahetvoḥ syādaikyaṁ janakajanyayoḥ|

pṛthaktve phalahetvoḥ syāttulyo heturahetunā||20||

若因果是一　　生及所生一

若因果是異　　因則同非因

།རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ན། །བསྐྱེད་བྱ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་གཅིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར། །རྒྱུ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཞན་ཉིད་ན། །རྒྱུ་དང་རྒྱུ་མིན་མཚུངས་པར་འགྱུར།

If there were to be identity of cause and effect, then there would be oneness of producer and the produce. If there were to be difference between cause and effect, then the cause would be equal to a non-cause.

phalaṁ svabhāvasadbhūtaṁ kiṁ heturjanayiṣyati|

phalaṁ svabhāvāsadbhūtaṁ kiṁ heturjanayiṣyati||21||

若果定有性　　因為何所生

若果定無性　　因為何所生

།འབྲས་བུ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡོད་ན། །རྒྱུས་ནི་ཅི་ཞིག་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད། །འབྲས་བུ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་ན། །རྒྱུས་ནི་ཅི་ཞིག་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད།

How is it that a cause will produce an effect which comes to be on its own nature?

How is it that a cause will produce an effect which does not come to be its own nature?

na cājanayamānasya hetutvamupapadyate|

hetutvānupapattau ca phalaṁ kasya bhaviṣyati||22||

因不生果者　　則無有因相

若無有因相　　誰能有是果

།སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །རྒྱུ་ཉིད་འཐད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །རྒྱུ་ཉིད་འཐད་པ་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །འབྲས་བུ་གང་གི་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར།

Moreover, the causal efficacy of something that is not producing is not appropriate.

In the absence of causal efficacy, to what will the effect belong?

na ca pratyayahetūnāmiyamātmānamātmanā|

yā sāmagrī janayate sā kathaṁ janayetphalam||23||

若從眾因緣　　而有和合生

和合自不生　　云何能生果

།རྒྱུ་རྣམས་དང་ནི་རྐྱེན་དག་གི། །ཚོགས་པ་གང་ཡིན་དེ་ཡིན་ནི། །བདག་གིས་བདག་ཉིད་མི་སྐྱེད་ན། །འབྲས་བུ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད།

Whatever harmony of causes and conditions there is, it is not produced

by itself or by another. If so, how can it produce an effect?

na sāmagrīkṛtaṁ phalaṁ nāsāmagrīkṛtaṁ phalam|

asti pratyayasāmagrī kuta eva phalaṁ vinā||24||

是故果不從　　緣合不合生

若無有果者　　何處有合法

།དེ་ཕྱིར་ཚོགས་པས་བྱས་པ་མེད། །ཚོགས་མིན་བྱས་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་མེད། །འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །རྐྱེན་གྱི་ཚོགས་པ་ག་ལ་ཡོད།

།ཚོགས་པ་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉི་ཤུ་པའོ།།

The effect is not made by the harmony, nor is it not made by a harmony.

Where indeed can there be a harmony of connections without an effect.

21. saṁbhavavibhavaparīkṣā ekaviṁśatitamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀成壞品第二十一

vinā vā saha vā nāsti vibhavaḥ saṁbhavena vai|

vinā vā saha vā nāsti saṁbhavo vibhavena vai||1||

離成及共成　　是中無有壞

離壞及共壞　　是中亦無成

།།འཇིག་པ་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པར་རམ། །ལྷན་ཅིག་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན། །འབྱུང་བ་འཇིག་པ་མེད་པར་རམ། །ལྷན་ཅིག་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན།

Dissolution does not exist either without or with occurrence. Occurrence does not exist either without or with dissolution.

bhaviṣyati kathaṁ nāma vibhavaḥ saṁbhavaṁ vinā|

vinaiva janma maraṇaṁ vibhavo nodbhavaṁ vinā||2||

若離於成者　　云何而有壞

如離生有死　　是事則不然

།འཇིག་པ་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པར་ནི། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ན་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་འཆི་བར་འགྱུར། །འཇིག་པ་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པར་མེད།

How can there be dissolution without occurrence, death without birth, dissolution without uprising?

saṁbhavenaiva vibhavaḥ kathaṁ saha bhaviṣyati|

na janmamaraṇaṁ caivaṁ tulyakālaṁ hi vidyate||3||

成壞共有者　　云何有成壞

如世間生死　　一時俱不然

།འཇིག་པ་འབྱུང་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་ཏུ། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར། །འཆི་བ་སྐྱེ་དང་དུས་གཅིག་ཏུ། །ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

How can there be dissolution along with occurrence? Indeed, simultaneous birth and death are similarly not evident.

bhaviṣyati kathaṁ nāma saṁbhavo vibhavaṁ vinā|

anityatā hi bhāveṣu na kadācinna vidyate||4||

若離於壞者　　云何當有成

無常未曾有　　不在諸法時

།འབྱུང་བ་འཇིག་པ་མེད་པར་ནི། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ན་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་མི་རྟག་ཉིད། །ནམ་ཡང་མེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ༑

How can there be occurrence without dissolution, for the impermanence in existences is never not evident.

saṁbhavo vibhavenaiva kathaṁ saha bhaviṣyati|

na janmamaraṇaṁ caiva tulyakālaṁ hi vidyate||5||

成壞共無成　　離亦無有成

是二俱不可　　云何當有成

།འབྱུང་བ་འཇིག་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་ཏུ། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར། །སྐྱེ་བ་འཆི་དང་དུས་གཅིག་ཏུ། །ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

How can occurrence be evident along with disolution?

Indeed, simultaneous birth and death are similarly not evident.

sahānyonyena vā siddhirvinānyonyena vā yayoḥ|

na vidyate, tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṁ nu khalu vidyate||6||

།གང་དག་ཕན་ཚུན་ལྷན་ཅིག་གམ། །ཕན་ཚུན་ལྷན་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར། །གྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་དག་གྲུབ་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད།

The occurrence of things, either together or separately, is not evident.

If so, how can their establishment be evident?

kṣayasya saṁbhavo nāsti nākṣayasyāpi saṁbhavaḥ|

kṣayasya vibhavo nāsti vibhavo nākṣayasya ca||7||

盡則無有成　　不盡亦無成

盡則無有壞　　不盡亦不壞

།ཟད་ལ་འབྱུང་བ་ ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །མ་ཟད་པ་ལའང་འབྱུང་བ་མེད། །ཟད་ལ་འཇིག་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །མ་ཟད་པ་ལའང་འཇིག་པ་མེད།

Occurrence of that which is waning does not exist, nor is there occurrence of that which is not waning. Dissolution of that which is waning does not exist, nor is there dissolution of the not waning.

saṁbhavo vibhavaścaiva vinā bhāvaṁ na vidyate|

saṁbhavaṁ vibhavaṁ caiva vinā bhāvo na vidyate||8||

若離於成壞　　是亦無有法

若當離於法　　亦無有成壞

།དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར། །འབྱུང་དང་འཇིག་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །འབྱུང་དང་འཇིག་པ་མེད་པར་ནི། །དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

Without an existent, occurrsncc as well as dissolution are not evident.

Without occurrence as well as dissolution, an existent is not evident.

saṁbhavo vibhavaścaiva na śūnyasyopapadyate|

saṁbhavo vibhavaścaiva nāśūnyasyopapadyate||9||

若法性空者　　誰當有成壞

若性不空者　　亦無有成壞

།སྟོང་ལ་འབྱུང་དང་འཇིག་པ་ དག །འཐད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །མི་སྟོང་པ་ལའང་འབྱུང་འཇིག་དག །འཐད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

Either occurrence or dissolution of the empty is not appropriate.

Either occurrence or dissolution of the non-empty is also not appropriate.

saṁbhavo vibhavaścaiva naika ityupapadyate|

saṁbhavo vibhavaścaiva na nānetyupapadyate||10||

成壞若一者　　是事則不然

成壞若異者　　是事亦不然

།འབྱུང་བ་དང་ནི་འཇིག་པ་དག །གཅིག་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འཐད་དོ། །འབྱུང་བ་དང་ནི་འཇིག་པ་དག །གཞན་ཉིད་དུ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དོ།

It is not appropriate to assume that occurrence and dissolution are identical.

It is not appropriate to assume that occurrence and dissolution are different.

dṛśyate saṁbhavaścaiva vibhavaścaiva te bhavet|

dṛśyate saṁbhavaścaiva mohādvibhava eva ca||11||

若謂以眼見　　而有生滅者

則為是癡妄　　而見有生滅

།འབྱུང་བ་དང་ནི་འཇིག་པ་དག །མཐོང་ངོ་སྙམ་དུ་ ཁྱོད་སེམས་ན། །འབྱུང་བ་དང་ནི་འཇིག་པ་དག། །གཏི་མུག་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན།

It may occur to you rhat both occurrence and dissolution are seen.

However, both occurrence and dissolution are seen only through confusion.

na bhāvājjāyate bhāvo bhāvo'bhāvānna jāyate|

nābhāvājjāyate'bhāvo'bhāvo bhāvānna jāyate||12||

從法不生法　　亦不生非法

從非法不生　　法及於非法

།དངོས་པོ་དངོས་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། །དངོས་པོ་དངོས་མེད་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ། །དངོས་མེད་དངོས་མེད་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། །དངོས་མེད་དངོས་ལས་མི་སྐྱེའོ།

An existent does not arise from an existent; neither does an existent arise from a non-existent. A non-existent does not arise from a non-existent; neither does a non-existent arise from an existent.

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate|

na svataḥ parataścaiva jāyate, jāyate kutaḥ||13||

法不從自生　　亦不從他生

不從自他生　　云何而有生

།དངོས་པོ་བདག་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ། །གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཉིད་ མ་ཡིན། །བདག་དང་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི། །ཡོད་མིན་ཇི་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར།

An existent does not arise from itself, or from another or from both itself and another, Whence can it then arise?

bhāvamabhyupapannasya śāśvatocchedadarśanam|

prasajyate sa bhāvo hi nityo'nityo'tha vā bhavet||14||

若有所受法　　即墮於斷常

當知所受法　　為常為無常

།དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་བླངས་ན། །རྟག་དང་ཆད་པར་ལྟ་བར་ནི། །ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་དངོས་དེ་ནི། །རྟག་དང་མི་རྟག་འགྱུར་ཕྱིར་རོ།

For him who is engrossed in existence, eternalism or annihiiationism will necessarily follow, for he would assume that it is either permanent or impermanent.

bhāvamabhyupapannasya naivocchedo na śāśvatam|

udayavyayasaṁtānaḥphalahetvorbhavaḥ sa hi||15||

所有受法者　　不墮於斷常

因果相續故　　不斷亦不常

།དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་བླངས་ཀྱང༌། །ཆད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རྟག་མི་ འགྱུར། །འབྲས་བུ་རྒྱུ་ཡི་འབྱུང་འཇིག་གི །རྒྱུན་དེ་སྲིད་པ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་རོ།

[On the contrary,] for him who is engrossed in existence, there would be neither anihilationism nor eternalism, for, indeed, becoming is the series of uprising and ceasing of cause and effect.

udayavyayasaṁtānaḥ phalahetvorbhavaḥ sa cet|

vyayasyāpunarutpatterhetūcchedaḥ prasajyate||16||

若因果生滅　　相續而不斷

滅更不生故　　因即為斷滅

།འབྲས་བུ་རྒྱུ་ཡི་འབྱུང་འཇིག་གི། །རྒྱུན་དེ་སྲིད་པ་ཡིན་འགྱུར་ན། །འཇིག་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །རྒྱུ་ནི་ཆད་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར།

If it is assumed that becoming is the series of uprising and ceasing of the cause and effect, then with the repeated non-arising of that which ceases, it will follow that there will be annihilation of the cause.

sadbhāvasya svabhāvena nāsadbhāvaśca yujyate|

nirvāṇakāle cocchedaḥ praśamādbhavasaṁtateḥ||17||

法住於自性　　不應有有無

涅槃滅相續　　則墮於斷滅

།དངོས་པོ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡོད་ན། །དངོས་མེད་འགྱུར་བར་མི་རིགས་སོ། །མྱ་ངན་འདས་པའི་དུས་ན་ཆད། །སྲིད་རྒྱུན་རབ་ཏུ་ཞི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

The non-existence of that whch possesses existence in terms of self-nature is not appropriate. [On the contrary,] at the time of freedom, thete will be annihilation as a result of the appeasement of the stream of becoming.

carame na niruddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaḥ|

carame nāniruddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaḥ||18||

若初有滅者　　則無有後有

初有若不滅　　亦無有後有

།ཐ་མ་འགགས་པར་གྱུར་པ་ན། །སྲིད་པ་དང་པོ་རིགས་མི་འགྱུར། །ཐ་མ་འགགས་པར་མ་གྱུར་ཚེ། །སྲིད་པ་དང་པོ་རིགས་མི་འགྱུར།

It is not proper to assume that there is first becoming when the last has ceased.

Nor is it proper to assume that there is first becoming when the last has not ceased.

nirudhyamāne carame prathamo yadi jāyate|

nirudhyamāna ekaḥ syājjāyamāno'paro bhavet||19||

若初有滅時　　而後有生者

滅時是一有　　生時是一有

།གལ་ཏེ་ཐ་མ་འགག་བཞིན་ན། །དང་པོ་སྐྱེ་བར་ འགྱུར་ན་ནི། །འགག་བཞིན་པ་ནི་གཅིག་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་ཡང་གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར།

If the fist were to be born when the last is ceasing, then that which is ceasing would be one and that which is being born would be another.

na cennirudhyamānaśca jāyamānaśca yujyate|

sārdhaṁ ca mriyate yeṣu teṣu skandheṣu jāyate||20||

若言於生滅　　而謂一時者

則於此陰死　　即於此陰生

།གལ་ཏེ་འགག་བཞིན་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་དག། །ལྷན་ཅིག་ཏུ་ཡང་རིགས་མིན་ན། །ཕུང་པོ་གང་ལ་འཆི་འགྱུར་བ། །དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བ་འབྱུང་འགྱུར་རམ།

If it is asserted that the ceasing is also the being born, this would not be proper. For, in that case, whatever that is born in relation to the aggregates, would also be dying at the same time.

evaṁ triṣvapi kāleṣu na yuktā bhavasaṁtatiḥ|

triṣu kāleṣu yā nāsti sā kathaṁ bhavasaṁtatiḥ||21||

三世中求有　　相續不可得

若三世中無　　何有有相續

།དེ་ལྟར་དུས་གསུམ་དག་ཏུ་ཡང༑ །སྲིད་པའི་རྒྱུན་ནི་མི་རིགས་ན། །དུས་གསུམ་དག་ཏུ་གང་མེད་པ། །དེ་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་སྲིད་པའི་རྒྱུན།

།འབྱུང་བ་དང་འཇིག་པ་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉི་ཤུ་གཅིག་པའོ།།

Thus, the stream of becoming is not proper in the context of the three periods of time.

How can there be a stream of becoming that does not exist during the three periods of time?

22. tathāgataparīkṣā dvāviṁśatitamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀如來品第二十二

skandhā na nānyaḥ skandhebhyo nāsmin skandhā na teṣu saḥ|

tathāgataḥ skandhavānna katamo'tra tathāgataḥ||1||

非陰不離陰　　此彼不相在

如來不有陰　　何處有如來

།།ཕུང་མིན་ཕུང་པོ་ལས་གཞན་མིན། །དེ་ལ་ཕུང་མེད་དེ་དེར་མེད། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་ཕུང་ལྡན་མིན། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན།

The tathāgata is neither the aggregates nor different from them. The aggregates are not in him; nor is he in the aggregates. He is not possessed of the aggregates. In such a context, who is a tathāgata?

buddhaḥ skandhānupādāya yadi nāsti svabhāvataḥ|

svabhāvataśca yo nāsti kutaḥ sa parabhāvataḥ||2||

陰合有如來　　則無有自性

若無有自性　　云何因他有

།གལ་ཏེ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཕུང་པོ་ལ། །བརྟེན་ནས་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ཡོད་མིན། །རང་བཞིན་ལས་ནི་གང་མེད་པ། །དེ་གཞན་དངོས་ལས་ག་ལ་ཡོད།

If a Buddha were to be dependent upon the aggregates, he does not exist in term of self-nature. He who dos not exist in terms of self-nature, how can he exist in terms of other nature?

pratītya parabhāvaṁ yaḥ so'nātmetyupapadyate|

yaścānātmā sa ca kathaṁ bhaviṣyati tathāgataḥ||3||

法若因他生　　是即為非我

若法非我者　　云何是如來

།གང་ཞིག་གཞན་གྱི་དངོས་བརྟེན་ནས། །དེ་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འཐད་དོ། །གང་ཞིག་བདག་ཉིད་མེད་པ་དེ། །ཇི་ལྟར་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པར་འགྱུར།

He who is dependent upon other nature would appropriately be without self. Yet, how can he who is without self be a tathāgata?

yadi nāsti svabhāvaśca parabhāvaḥ kathaṁ bhavet|

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāmṛte kaḥ sa tathāgataḥ||4||

若無有自性　　云何有他性

離自性他性　　何名為如來

།གལ་ཏེ་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །གཞན་དངོས་ཡོད་པར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར། །རང་བཞིན་དང་ནི་གཞན་དངོས་དག། །མ་གཏོགས་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་དེ་གང༌།

If there exists no self-nature, how could there be other-nature? Without both self-nature and other-nature, who is this tathāgata?

skandhān yadyanupādāya bhavetkaścittathāgataḥ|

sa idānīmupādadyādupādāya tato bhavet||5||

若不因五陰　　先有如來者

以今受陰故　　則說為如來

།གལ་ཏེ་ཕུང་པོ་མ་བརྟེན་པར། ། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་འགའ་ཡོད་ན། །དེ་ནི་ད་གདོང་རྟེན་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། །བརྟེན་ནས་དེ་ནས་འགྱུར་ལ་རག།

If there were to be a tathāgata because of non-grasping on to the aggregates, he should still depend upon them in the present. As such he will be dependent.

skandhāṁścāpyanupādāya nāsti kaścittathāgataḥ|

yaśca nāstyanupādāya sa upādāsyate katham||6||

今實不受陰　　更無如來法

若以不受無　　今當云何受

།ཕུང་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་མ་བརྟེན་པར། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་འགའ་ཡང་མེད། །གང་ཞིག་མ་བརྟེན་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །དེས་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་ཉེར་ལེན་འགྱུར།

There exists no tathāgata independent of the aggregate. How can he who does not exist dependently be grasped?

na bhavatyanupādattamupādānaṁ ca kiṁcana|

na cāsti nirupādānaḥ kathaṁcana tathāgataḥ||7||

若其未有受　　所受不名受

無有無受法　　而名為如來

།ཉེ་བར་བླངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ༑ །ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པར་ཅིས་མི་འགྱུར། །ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་མེད་པ་ཡི། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་ཅི་ཡང་མེད།

There is no sphere of non-grasping, nor is there something as grasping.

Neither is there someone who is without grasping. How can there be a tathāgata?

tattvānyatvena yo nāsti mṛgyamāṇaśca pañcadhā|

upādānena sa kathaṁ prajñapyeta tathāgataḥ||8||

若於一異中　　如來不可得

五種求亦無　　云何受中有

།རྣམ་པ་ལྔས་ནི་བཙལ་བྱས་ན། །གང་ཞིག་དེ་ཉིད་གཞན་ཉིད་དུ། །མེད་པའི་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་དེ། །ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པས་ཇི་ལྟར་གདགས།

He who, sought for in the fivefold manner, does not exist in the form of a different identity, how can that tathāgata be made known through grasping?

yadapīdamupādānaṁ tatsvabhāvatvānna vidyate|

svabhāvataśca yannāsti kutastatparabhāvataḥ||9||

又所受五陰　　不從自性有

若無自性者　　云何有他性

།གང་ཞིག་ཉེ་བར་བླང་བ་དེ། །དེ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ཡོད་མིན། །བདག་གི་དངོས་ལས་གང་མེད་པ། །དེ་གཞན་དངོས་ལས་ཡོད་རེ་སྐན།

This gaping is not found in terms of self-nature. How can that which does not exist in terms of self-nature come to be in terms of other-nature.

evaṁ śūnyamupādānamupādātā ca sarvaśaḥ|

prajñapyate ca śūnyena kathaṁ śūnyastathāgataḥ||10||

以如是義故　　受空受者空

云何當以空　　而說空如來

།དེ་ལྟར་ཉེར་བླང་ཉེར་ལེན་པོ། །རྣམ་པ་ཀུན་གྱིས་སྟོང་པ་ཡིན། །སྟོང་པས་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་སྟོང་པ། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ན་འདོགས་པར་འགྱུར།

Thus, grasping and grasper are empty in every way. How can an empty tathāgata be made known by something that is empty?

śūnyamiti na vaktavyamaśūnyamiti vā bhavet|

ubhayaṁ nobhayaṁ ceti prajñaptyarthaṁ tu kathyate||11||

空則不可說　　非空不可說

共不共叵說　　但以假名說

།སྟོང་ངོ་ཞེས་ཀྱང་མི་བརྗོད་དེ། །མི་ སྟོང་ཞེས་ཀྱང་མི་བྱ་ཞིང༌། །གཉིས་དང་གཉིས་མིན་མི་བྱ་སྟེ། །གདགས་པའི་དོན་དུ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ།

“Empty," "non-empty, " "both" or "neither-these should nor be declared. It is expressed only for the purpose of communication.

śāśvatāśāśvatādyā kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam|

antānantādi cāpyatra kuntaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam||12||

寂滅相中無　　常無常等四

寂滅相中無　　邊無邊等四

།རྟག་དང་མི་རྟག་ལ་སོགས་བཞི། །ཞི་བ་འདི་ལ་ག་ལ་ཡོད། །མཐའ་དང་མཐའ་མེད་ལ་སོགས་བཞི། །ཞི་བ་འདི་ལ་ག་ལ་ཡོད།

How can the tetralemma of eternal, non-eternal, etc., be in the peaceful!

How can the tetralemma of finite, infmire, etc., be in the peaceful?

yena grāho gṛhītastu ghano'stīti[4] tathāgataḥ|

nāstīti sa vikalpayannirvṛtasyāpi kalpayet||13||

邪見深厚者　　則說無如來

如來寂滅相　　分別有亦非

།གང་གིས་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་ཡོད་ཅེས། ། འཛིན་པ་སྟུག་པོ་བཟུང་གྱུར་པ། །དེ་ནི་མྱ་ངན་འདས་པ་ལ། །མེད་ཅེས་རྣམ་རྟོག་རྟོག་པར་བྱེད།

Discriminating on the basis of gaping or the grasped, and firmly insisting that a tathāgata ''exists" or "does not exist," a person would think similarly even of one who has ceased.

svabhāvataśca śūnye'smiṁścintā naivopapadyate|

paraṁ nirodhādbhavati buddho na bhavatīti vā||14||

如是性空中　　思惟亦不可

如來滅度後　　分別於有無

།རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ནི་སྟོང་དེ་ལ། །སངས་རྒྱས་མྱ་ངན་འདས་ནས་ནི། །ཡོད་དོ་ཞེའམ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས། །བསམ་པ་འཐད་པ་ཉིད་མི་འགྱུར།

When he is empty in term of self-nature, the thought that the Buddha exists or does not exist after death is not appropriate.

prapañcayanti ye buddhaṁ prapañcātītamavyayam|

te prapañcahatāḥ sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam||15||

如來過戲論　　而人生戲論

戲論破慧眼　　是皆不見佛

།གང་དག་སངས་རྒྱས་སྤྲོས་འདས་ཤིང༌། །ཟད་ པ་མེད་ལ་སྤྲོས་བྱེད་པ། །སྤྲོས་པས་ཉམས་པ་དེ་ཀུན་གྱིས། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་མཐོང་མི་འགྱུར།

Those who generate obsession with great regard to the Buddha who has gone beyond obsessions and is constant, all of them, impaired by obsessions, do not perceive the tathāgata.

tathāgato yatsvabhāvastatsvabhāvamidaṁ jagat|

tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvamidaṁ jagat||16||

如來所有性　　即是世間性

如來無有性　　世間亦無性

།དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གང༌། །དེ་ནི་འགྲོ་འདིའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན། །དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་རང་བཞིན་མེད། །འགྲོ་བ་འདི་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་མེད།

།དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་ པ་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་ཉི་ཤུ་གཉིས་པའོ།།

Whatever is the self-nature of the tathāgata, that is also the self-nature of the universe.

The tathāgata is devoid of self-nature. This universe is also devoid of self-nature.

12.saṁskāraparīkṣā trayodaśamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀行品第十三

tanmṛṣā moṣadharma yadbhagavānityabhāṣata|

sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṁskārāstena te mṛṣā||1||

如佛經所說　　虛誑妄取相

諸行妄取故　　是名為虛誑

།།བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་གང་ཞིག །སླུ་བ་དེ་ནི་བརྫུན་ཞེས་གསུངས། །འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་ཅད་སླུ་བའི་ཆོས། །དེས་ན་དེ་དག་བརྫུན་པ་ཡིན།

The Blessed One has said that whatever is of deceptive nature, that is delusion. All things that are of deceptive nature involve dispositions. Therefore, they are delusions.

tanmṛṣā moṣadharma yadyadi kiṁ tatra muṣyate|

etattūktaṁ bhagavatā śūnyatāparidīpakam||2||

虛誑妄取者　　是中何所取

佛說如是事　　欲以示空義

།གལ་ཏེ་སླུ་ཆོས་གང་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་བརྫུན་དེ་ལ་ཅི་ཞིག་སླུ། །བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་དེ་ གསུངས་པ། །སྟོང་ཉིད་ཡོངས་སུ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན།

If, whatever that is of deceptive nature is delusion, what is it about which there is delusion? That too, namely, that which illuminates emptiness, has been spoken of by the Blessed One.

bhāvānāṁ niḥsvabhāvatvamanyathābhāvadarśanāt|

asvabhāvo bhāvo nāsti[1] bhāvānāṁ śūnyatā yataḥ||3||

諸法有異故　　知皆是無性

無性法亦無　　一切法空故

།དངོས་རྣམས་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་དེ། །གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་སྣང་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དངོས་པོ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་མེད། །གང་ཕྱིར་དངོས་རྣམས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

Because of the perception of change, the absence of self-nature of existents is [recognized]. Because of the emptiness of existents, there is no existent without self-nature.

諸法若無性　　云何說嬰兒[2]

乃至於老年　　而有種種異

kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaścenna vidyate|

kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate||4||

若諸法有性　　云何而得異

若諸法無性　　云何而有異

།གལ་ཏེ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་ན། །གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་གང་གི་ཡིན། །གལ་ཏེ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཡོད་ན། ། གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བར་ཇི་ལྟར་རུང༌།

Whose change would there be, if self-nature were not evident? Again, whose change would there be, if self-nature were evident?

tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo nāpyanyasyaiva yujyate|

yuvā na jīryate yasmādyasmājjīrṇo na jīryate||5||

是法則無異　　異法亦無異

如壯不作老　　老亦不作壯

།དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་གཞན་འགྱུར་མེད། །གཞན་ཉིད་ལ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །གང་ཕྱིར་གཞོན་ནུ་མི་རྒ་སྟེ། །གང་ཕྱིར་རྒས་པའང་མི་རྒའོ།

Neither change of something in itself nor of something different is proper.

The reason being that a youth does not age nor does an aged person age.

tasya cedanyathābhāvaḥ kṣīrameva bhaveddadhi|

kṣīrādanyasya kasyātha dadhibhāvo bhaviṣyati||6||

若是法即異　　乳應即是酪

離乳有何法　　而能作於酪

།གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ཉིད་གཞན་འགྱུར་ན། །འོ་མ་ཉིད་ནི་ཞོར་འགྱུར་རོ། །འོ་མ་ལས་གཞན་གང་ཞིག་ནི། །ཞོ་ཡི་དངོས་ པོ་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར།

If change were to be of something in itself, then milk itself would be butter.

Butter-ness would then be something other than milk.

yadyaśūnyaṁ bhavetkiṁcitsyācchūnyamiti kiṁcana|

na kiṁcidastyaśūnyaṁ ca kutaḥ śūnyaṁ bhaviṣyati||7||

若有不空法　　則應有空法

實無不空法　　何得有空法

།གལ་ཏེ་སྟོང་མིན་ཅུང་ཟད་ཡོད། །སྟོང་པ་ཅུང་ཟད་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །མི་སྟོང་ཅུང་ཟད་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །སྟོང་པ་ཡོད་པར་ག་ལ་འགྱུར།

If there were to be something non-empty, there would then be something called empty. However, there is nothing that is non-empty. How could there be something empty?

śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṁ proktā niḥsaraṇaṁ jinaiḥ|

yeṣāṁ tu śūnyatā dṛṣṭistānasādhyān babhāṣire||8||

大聖說空法　　為離諸見故

若復見有空　　諸佛所不化

།རྒྱལ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད། །ལྟ་ཀུན་ངེས་པར་འབྱུང་བར་གསུངས། །གང་དག་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ལྟ་བ། །དེ་ དག་བསྒྲུབ་ཏུ་མེད་པར་གསུངས།

།འདུ་བྱེད་བརྟག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་བཅུ་སུམ་པའོ།།

The Victorious Ones have amounced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views.

Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.

13.saṁsargaparīkṣā caturdaśamaṁ prakaraṇam|

觀合品第十四

draṣṭavyaṁ darśanaṁ draṣṭā trīṇyetāni dviśo dviśaḥ|

sarvaśaśca na saṁsargamanyonyena vrajantyuta||1||

見可見見者　　是三各異方

如是三法異　　終無有合時

།།བལྟ་བྱ་ལྟ་བ་ལྟ་བ་པོ། །གསུམ་པོ་དེ་དག་གཉིས་གཉིས་དང༌། །ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱང་ནི་ཕན་ཚུན་དུ། །ཕྲད་པར་འགྱུར་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

The object of seeing, the seeing and the seer - these three do not function in mutual association either in pairs or all together.

evaṁ rāgaśca raktaśca rañjanīyaṁ ca dṛśyatām|

traidhena śeṣāḥ kleśāśca śeṣāṇyāyatanāni ca||2||

染與於可染　　染者亦復然

餘入餘煩惱　　皆亦復如是

།དེ་བཞིན་འདོད་ཆགས་ཆགས་པ་ དང༑ །ཆགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཉོན་མོངས་པ། །ལྷག་མ་རྣམས་དང་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ཀྱི། །ལྷག་མའང་རྣམ་པ་གསུམ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས།

Lust, the lustful as well as the object of lust should be seen in the same way. The remaining defilements as well as the remaining spheres of sense should be seen in the triadic mode.

anyenānyasya saṁsargastaccānyatvaṁ na vidyate|

draṣṭavyaprabhṛtīnāṁ yanna saṁsargaṁ vrajantyataḥ||3||

異法當有合　　見等無有異

異相不成故　　見等云何合

།གཞན་དང་གཞན་དུ་ཕྲད་འགྱུར་ན། །གང་ཕྱིར་བལྟ་བྱ་ལ་སོགས་ལ། །གཞན་དེ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་ཕྲད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།

Association is of the mutually different [events]. Such difference is not evident in the objects of seeing, etc. Therefore, they do not function in mutual association.

na ca kevalamanyatvaṁ draṣṭavyāderna vidyate|

kasyacitkenacitsārdhaṁ nānyatvamupapadyate||4||

非但見等法　　異相不可得

所有一切法　　皆亦無異相

།བལྟ་བྱ་ལ་སོགས་ འབའ་ཞིག་ལ། །གཞན་ཉིད་མེད་པར་མ་ཟད་ཀྱི། །གང་ཡང་གང་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་ཏུ། །གཞན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་འཐད་དོ།

It is not only that the difference with regard to objects of seeing, etc. is not evident; the possibility of something possessing difference jointly with another is also not appropriate.

anyadanyatpratītyānyannānyadanyadṛte'nyataḥ|

yatpratītya ca yattasmāttadanyannopapadyate||5||

異因異有異　　異離異無異

若法從因出　　是法不異因

།གཞན་ནི་གཞན་ལ་བརྟེན་ཏེ་གཞན། །གཞན་མེད་པར་གཞན་གཞན་མི་འགྱུར། །གང་ལ་བརྟེན་ཏེ་གང་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ནི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་མི་འཐད།

Different things are dependent upon different things. Different things are not without different things. Because something depends upon something, a different thing is not appropriate.